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About the Author
W. S. WOYTINSKY has been one of the leading economists of the Western
world for nearly four decades. Trained at St. Petersburg University before
World \Var I, he worked in Berlin and Geneva before coming to the United
States in 1935. Here he has served the Federal Government (in various
capacities) as well as several private research orgainzations and Johns
Hopkins University. An extended tour of South Asia led to a 1956 NEW
LEADER series on "India: Awakening Giant,"
later published in book form by Harper's. An
eight-month research and lecture tour of Latin
America is responsible for this booklet.
Born in St. Petersburg in 1885, Woytinsky
as a student became a member of the Russian
Social Democratic Labor party. Though at first
he sympathized with the Bolshevik wing led by
Lenin, he assumed an independent position before World War I. Imprisoned by the Tsarist
Government in 1908, he wrote a highly influential novel on prison life, then spent nine years
in Siberian exile. Liberated in the March 1917
WOYTINSKY
democratic revolution, he served the moderate Provisional Government before Lenin's
seizure of power and the independent Social Democratic Government of
Georgia until its conquest by Lenin's forces in 1922. An economic writer in
Berlin from 1922 to 1928, he was director of statistics for the German
General Federation of Labor during the last five years of the Weimar
Republic, then worked for a year with the International Labor Office in
Geneva. While in Germany, he produced a seven-volume encyclopedia of
statistics, The World in Figures.
Dr. Woytinsky's U.S. Government service includes work with the Central Statistical Board (1934-35) and seven years as principal consulting
economist to the Social Security Board (1941-1947). Between 1935 and
1941, he worked with the committee on social security of the Social Science
Research Council. In 1947, Dr. Woytinsky became research director of the
Twentieth Century Fund and research professor of economics at Johns
Hopkins University.
Among his books are Social Consequences oj the Economic Depression,
Labor in the United States, Three Aspects oj Labor Dynamics, Earnings
and Social Security in the United States, and Employment and Wages in the
United States. \Vith his wife, E. S. Woytinsky, he wrote World Population
and Production and World Commerce and Government.
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FOREWORD
is a report on the eight-month trip my wife and I took
to Latin America in 1957-58, under the auspices of the
State Department exchange of specialists program. We visited
15 countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Puerto Rico, Haita, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador. We lectured or held seminars,
round-table discussions and conferences in 36 cities, including
most of the university centers south of the Rio Grande. In all
these cities we met with economists, Government officials,
journalists, businessmen and labor leaders. The U. S. Embassies, Consulates, ICA missions, information services and
binational institutes generously helped us in establishing contacts with local people and gathering printed materials. Local officials and intellectuals were equally generous in the frankness
with which they discussed their problems with us. We did not
resent their criticism of U. S. policy; they did not resent our
criticism of the policy of their governments.
I would like to use this opportunity to express, in the name
of my wife and myself, our warm gratitude to all who helped us
in the Latin American countries. Their friendliness and hospitality made our trip a unique experience.

T

HIS

-We S. Woytinsky
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PEO!PLE IN LIMA (above) ARE 9 TIMES RICHE·R THAN PERU·S VILLAGERS

1. Economic Progress
Poverty and Abundance: In Latin America, as in SDutheast Asia, eeDnnmic prDgress has ,become a part 'Of :the drive fnr natiDnal ,i ndependence and
dignity; industrializatiDn seems to' be Aladdin's lamp, the cure fDr lall evils.
But Latin America differs frnm SDutheast Asia in histDrical and eultural
background and in the level Df its eCDnomic develDpment.
The poverty of the peDple is hidden behin'd the glittering faQade Q1f magnificent Latin American cities. Peru is among the pDorest cD~ntries Df the
area in terms of per capita income, but Lima is among its mDst glamDrDus
capitals. TO' appraise the depth of pDverty in Latin America Dne does not
have to' gO' to' remDte villages in the uplands Df the Andes Dr in the jungles
of the upper Amazon. Sometimes, nDt far from the capital, poverty-stricken
villages hang -on rocky slDpes along a verdant valley dDminated by prDud
eastle-like mansions; sDmetimes they are lost in swamps between ·f ertile hills
where orchards and gardens surround IDvely haciendas.
Many cities are eneircled -by indescribable slums. ArDund Buenos Aires,
the slums are separated frDm the eity by a fDrtress-like wall; we drDve alDng
it, but were advised by local friends not to' trespass in that wDrld of misery.
In the nDrthwest part of South Amerioa-CDIDmbia, Ecuador, Peru and
BDlivia-misery overflDws intO' the central parts of the cities frDm adjacent
native markets and streets, where Indians in rags trDt with heavy IDads Doll
their shoulders and women carry their children like bundles Df pDtatDes. HeFe
6

misery as veiled by a psychological curtain: The city people do not notice
it, and the tourists record it as part of the local color.
Latin American economists are, of course, aware of the poverty of the
indigenous population but disagree among themselves as to what to do about
it. Along with eloquent champions of the Indians, we met experts who
claimed that the natives do not count in the national economy because they
create nothing, save nothing and invest nothing but simply consume the
produce of their soil. The problem, they assured us, is how to keep these
people outside the city limits, letting in only those needed for economically
sound purposes.
Per Capita Income: Averages fail to give a clear picture of the living
conditions of Latin American people. Some countries have no reliable
statistics; others, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, have different exchange rates for various transactions in foreign currency and there
is no accurate way to convert local money into U. S. doHars. When the freemarket exchange rates are used, national income appears too low; if
preferential rates art; accepted, it m.ay be overstated. Yet the latter method
has been accepted by the United Nations Commission for Latin America, and
I have used it in Table I below.
./ '
With reservations for a considerable margin of error and some appalling
inconsistencies (for example, the high per capita income in the Dominican
Republic and Guatemala as compared with Mexico, or in Cuba and Colombia
as compared with Brazil), per capita income for Latin America averaged
$240 in 1950, the last year for which more or less comparable data are
available. This amount compared favorably with Eastern Europe, approached the level of Italy, and was four to five times that of India and
I. Per Capita and Total National Income, 1950
.Countries

Per Capita
Income

Venezuela
Argentina .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . .. . . . ...... .
Uruguay ... ... ..... . .... ... . ..... . . .
Chile ... • ... . ... . ....... . . .... . .. . ..
Cuba . . ..... . . . . , . . ....... . . .. .. .. .. .
Colo~bia .. . -.. ... . .. . .. . ....... . . . .. .
Panama ; . . .. .. .. . ... . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .
Brazil . . ..... .. . . .. . .. . ....... . .. . . . . .
Dominican Republic ... . ..... . . . ..... .
Guatemala ... . ......... ... .. . ... . .. .
Ecuador-- ... .. ........ . .. .. ..... . ... .
Costa · Rica, EI Salvador, Honduras .. . . .
Mexico . .. ........ . .. . .. . .......... .
Peru, Haiti ..... ... . . . . ...... . ... .
Paragu·ay,. Nicaragua , Bolivia .. . . . .... .

$480
$395
$395
$350
$290
$255
$240
$210
$165
$150
$130
$125
$115
$ 95
$ 90

Population
in Millions

National Income ,
in Millions 01 $

4.9
17.2
2.4
6.1
5.5
11.1
.8
51.9
2.1
2.8
3.2
4.1
25.8
11.6
5.5

2,400
5,070
710
2,120
1,600
2,850
190
10,560
350
420
410
510
3,OO()
1,100
480

S ource : UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957.
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SCENE IN A MOUNTAIN VILLAGE IN COLOMBIA

the :Middle East. On the other hand, it lagged far behind per capita income
in Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.
In terms of per capita income, single Latin American nations range from
a standard of living nearly as low as India's to a level similar to that of
France. What is chaIiacteristic of La1tin America is not low average income
(which might ,be the result of technical backwardness), but extreme contrasts in the distribution of the social product among different groups of
the population (which is a social, rather It han ,technical, problem).
Peru illustrates this point. Out of its total population of 8.5 million,
about one million live in Lim'a, which in 1950 absorbed ,a bout 55 per cent of
the national income and had a per capita income close to, $445, as oompared
with $50 in the rest of the nation. Generally, rich people in Latin America
enjoy ahout the same comforts and luxuries as the rich in the United States.
I:f they have less cash, they employ more servants.
In hrief, Latin America ,t oday is neither "poor" nor "underdeveloped."
Rather, it should be described as an unevenly developed area, with the
villages lagging far behind the big cities. This difference in description
suggests different approaches to the fundamental problem which the area
is facing. If it were an underdeveloped area like India, its immediate task
would ,be to develop all sectors of the economy, without giving particular
priority to any 'One of them. Perhaps it would be advisable, fOT praotioal
reasons, to start with industry and shift later to agriculture. But, since the
present characteristic of Latin America is the striking contrast between
abundance and pGverty, its most urgent task is to reduce this CGntrast by
stimulating the development of the most backward sectors of its economy.
Industrialization: Most of the people in Latin America make their living in
agriculture and husbandry, but the distribution of the lab'Or fGrce by broad
ecGnomic sectors is changing gradually. Employment in manufacturing, construction and especially services (including trade) is growing more rapidly
than employment in the villages. According ,to the Economic Commission for

a

Latin America, the labor force In the area has been distributed In the following percentages:
Agricultu re . .. . ............ .. .. ....
Manufacturing and mining ...........
Construction . .................... ..
Services ...........................
Unknown and not specified ..... .. ....

1955
50.7
15.7
3.7
27.6
2.4

1945
56.2
/5.1
3./
23.2
2.3

Source: UN Eco nomic Bulletin for Latin America, San tiago, Chile, February 1957.

While the total labor force increased by 13.1 million between 1945 and
1955, only 4.1 million additional workers were absorbed by agriculture while
9 million found occupation in non-agricultural pursu~ts. Nevertheless, agricul- .
ture · still absorbs more than three times as many workers as manufacturing
and mining combined.
The distribution of the labor force among economic sectors varies widely
from country to country. Agriculture employs from 50 to 70 per cent of
the force in most Latin American republics, more than 70 per cent in Haiti,
Honduras and Guatemala, and less than 30 per cent in Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay. Only the last three nations can be described as agricultural-industrial. All the others should be classified as primarily agricultural countries.
A very different pattern appears in the distribution of national income
by industrial origin. According to the Economic Commission for Latin

II. Percentage Distribution of the Labor Force
Counfry

Agriculture

Haiti .. . . . . .. . .. ..
Honduras . . .......
Guatemala . .. . ....
Nicaragua .... ... .
Dominican Republic
EI Salvador .. . .....
Bolivia .. . .... . . .. .
Brazil ... .. ....... .
Peru ........... . ..
Paraguay ..........
Mexico ...... . .....
Colombia ... . .. . ..
Costa Rica . .....
Panama .. . ..... . .
Ecuador .. .. ... .. .
Cuba ........... . .
Venezuela .. . . ... . .
Chile ... .. . . ... .
Argentina .. .. . ....
Uruguay .. .. . .. .. .

77.4
75.7
74.8
69.7
69.7
64.2
63.3
61.1
58.8
58.3
57.8
56.4
56.4
54.9
50.9
43.8
41.2
29.8
24.7
21.7

Manufacturing & Mining Construction
6.6
8./
8.4
11.6
8. 1
11.3
14.9
13.5
16.9
15.6
13.2
/5.9
10.9
7.2
23.5
/6.0
12.7
23.3
23.4
23.9

Services

. Unknown

11.5
1/.0
11.6
/6.2
/7.5
18.5
/8.4
21.2
19.6
20.8
21.8
21./
25.7
25.7
/9.1
36.6
32.3
37.6
43.7
46.4

3.7
3.3
3.2

0.8
1.9
2.0
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.5
3.9
2.9
2.7
2.8
3.1
4.1
2.6
2.2
2.7
5.4
5.5
6.1
4.3

2.0
3.2
0.9
0.3
1.8
2.6
4.4
3.5
2.9
9.6
4.3
0.9
8.4
3.8
2.3
3.7

Source: UN EcoDomic Bulletin for Latin America, Santiago, Chile, February 1957.
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America, the gross product of the area was distributed by economic sectors
as follows (in percentages) :
Agriculture .... . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . . .... . . . . . .... . . . ... . ....
Manufacturing and mining . . . .......... . ... . . .. ... . . ...
Construction . .. . . . . ... ..... . .. . . ... . .. . . ... . . . ...... . . .
Services . .. ... . . . .. . ... .. ..... . ..... . ........ .. ........
Housing, rent .. .. ...... . .. . ..... . . . . . .. .... . .... . . .. . . .

24.5
22.5
4.6
44.4
4.0

The disparity between the shares of agricultur,al and non-agricultural pursuits in employment and national produot is described by the UN Commission as a ·difference in productivity of labor. It could more properly be
interpreted as an indication of the exploitation of rural areas by the cities.
Mo·r eover, a large part-probably two-thirds or three-fourths--of the income
originated in agriculture is consumed in the cities as the profits of absentee
land owners. This is one of the causes of the striking contrast between the
rich and the poor in this area.
Despite the predominance o·f agriculture in the economy of Latin America,
some regions in Brazil, MexicO', Argentina and Chile have reached a high
level of industrial development. There one sees large factories equipped with
the most modern machinery. On the other hand, industrial activity in remote corners of Latin America is concentrated in small shops reminiscent
of the 18th-century workshops in the United States and Western EurDpe.
In general, Latin America presents all eCDnomic patterns, from primitive
hoe-agriculture and colonial-type plantations to modern capitalism. Thatched
huts and cave-like adobe dwellings are as charaoteristic of the local scenery
as the ultra-modern skyscrapers of Sao Paulo, RiD de Janeiro, Buenos Aires
and Mexico City.
The present share of the area in the world industrial economy is rather
modest. According to the Statistical Office of the United Nations, all of
Latin America accounted for 3.4 per cent of world manufactures in 1953 (the
total excludes the countries of the Soviet ,b loc), as compared with 3.5 per
cent fDr Italy, 3.6 per cent for Cana1da, 4.6 per cent for France, 7.9 per cent
fDr Western Germany, 8.4 per cent tor the United Kingdom and 54.0
per cent for the United States. The net per capita value of industdal output
(value added by processing) for the whole area was close to' $35. Countries
with higher than average per capita output were: Argentina ($85), Venezuela
($59), MexicO' ($41) and Colombia ($39). However, Chile ($29) and
Br,azil ($25) were somewhat below the average. In other parts of the area,
the rate ranged between $10 and $20. These rates are fairly high in comparison with those for Asia or Africa, but very low in comparison with
the United States ($600) and Canada ($440).
This contrast might seem to justify the efforts of local governments to
promote rapid industrializ1a tion: They believe that, in order to catch up
with the mOore prosperous powers, their countries must start to run before
they have learned to walk. However, with full sympathy for the efforts of
Brazil or Mexico to become great industri'a l powers-which they , most
certainly will become some day-and with an understanding of the less
ambitious dreams of industriali~atiO'n of Chile, Colombia and sO'me smaller
10
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Latin American countries, one may doubt whether rapid industrialization
is their most urgent need. After all, most of them have learned to process
the staple articles consumed by the masses of their population. What they
lack la re factories to produce the finer articles which only the wealthy minority
o£ their people can afford, and the mills to produce machinery for such
factories. This may be a gap in their economic system, but it is by no
means as serious as the backwardness of local agriculture and the misery
in the villages.
Rate of Progress: How far have the Latin American nations succeeded in
their efforts to accelerate industrialization? The UN Statistical Office estimates that per capita industrial production increased 40 per cellit in Latin
America from 1948 to 1957, as compared , with 42 'per cent for North
America, 75-80 per cent for Europe and 'a bout 150 per cent for Asia and the
Middle East. Thus the rate of industrial growth in Latin America has just
about kept pace with that in the United States, a nation that is no longer
in the phase of progressive industrializ,a tion but has entered the stage in
which industrial expansion lags behind the growing production o-f services.
Moreover, it should be pointed out ,t hat the growth of manufactures has
been very unevenly distributed in Latin America. Apart from Peru, where
industrialization started from a very low level so It hat its percentage gain
in production is meaningless, per capita industrial output rose at an annual
rate of about 5 per cent in Brazil and Mexico in the 1947-57 decade and' 2.5
per cent in Chile, while it steadily declined in Argentina.
11

Changes in natiDnal inCDme reveal a similar pattern. The periDd 1948-55
brDught gains Df 20 to. 25 per cent in real per capita incDme in Brazil, Mexico.
and CDlombia, practically no. gain in Chile and a net IDSS Df 11 per cent
in Argentina. The conclusion is inescapable that Latin American cDuntries
have not been tDD successful in their attempt to. start running befDre learning
to. walk.

2. The Colonial Heritage

W

HY IS IT THAT the Spanish cDlonies in the South of the Western
Hemisphere, which once were economically far ahead Df the British
colonies in the North, have fallen behind? Why is it that even now the
South cannot come closer to the North, despite its abundance of natur~l
resources, the high quality of its population, the competence of its economists,
architects and engineers, and the effDrts of its governments? The distributio.n of roDnomic power in our hemisphere changed drastically in the century
that elapsed between the Latin American wars for independence and World
War I.
In terms of accumulated wealth, large cities, ports, established foreign
trade and even the technical equipment of plantations, the liberated Spanish
co.lonies prohably had a better start than the United States and Canada. But,
because Df the deep difference between Spanish and British colDnization,
liberation did no.t mean the same thing in the two. areas.
The British cQlonies in the North were founded by settlers who came to
the New World from England and other parts of Northwestern EurDpe in
search of a place to. live, relying Dn their own efforts. Once free from foreign
tutelage, responding to. the challenge of the austere environment, they established an essentially plebeian sDciety on virgin So.il. Molding the new
nations required compromising divergent interests and ideas. The U. S.
and Canada did nDt embody all the golden dreams of the early pioneers,
but they did go. farther tDward realizing aspirations for individual freedom
and equality than other nations then existing. Special privileges for the
rich were not completely abolished but were checked in time by the people,
and opportunity for all was prDtected by law and oustom. Whatever the
£laws in the governments o.f the two natiDns, they maintained the spirit of
hard work and a relentless drive fDr imprDvement ,i n the people.
In contrast, the wars fDr independence in Latin America were essentially
revolts of looal (Creole) ruling classes against the ·appointees of the Spanish
Crown, who. appropriated the lion's share Df the produce Df the subjugated
land and people. Of course, along with the aristDcrats, humble peDple were
in the ranks Df the independence armies just as other humble people fought
under the Spanish banp.er. Some leaders of the independence movement were
open to. the liberal ideas orf their time, but most o.f them had no quarrel with
the colonial socio-econDm,ic system. The Spanish triad-the rich landowner,
priest and professional soldier-stood at the top of the social pyramid,
native serfs, imported slaves and oommon workers at the bDttom. The independence leaders perpetuated this system in their new republics. They had
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no lear of oppositiDn from the lower classes; the backbone of their resistance
had been broken by bloody repression of Indian revolts before the wars
lor independence. Thus, the young Latin American republics inherited the
rigid social stratification estahlished by colonial masters, a system which
prDvided the upper classes with all sorts Df cDmforts and privileges, leaving
the masses of the people only the blessing of pDverty. The monolith of the
Spanish colonial empire was shattered, but its spirit remained alive.
A society hased on such a foundation tends to consider manual work distasteful and, to SOlllle extent, this applies to all economic activities except those
reserved for the hereditary aristocracy. A nobleman may enrich himself
through the la.bor of slaves Dn his plantation, by speculating in real estate,
lending 111oney, obtaining gifts frDm the government or graft from the
people, but he betrays his birthright if he uses his muscles for work. This
code of honor of the Latin American ruling classes in the early years of
independence negated their initial advantages, in comparison with North
America, in accumulated wealth or (using the modern term) the capital at
their disposal. Without the incentive to work, which is the mainspring of
ec0'nomic progress, the Latin American nations were bound to fall ·b ack
while the former British colonies were advancing.
The difference in the social fabric of the American nations that emerged
in the 19th century-a,nd, more specifically, the difference ,i n the compositi0'n
of the upper classes-----determined the contrast in their ,f urther development,
even though the constitutions of the South were molded largely after the
Northern pattern. What counted was not the principles solemnly proclaimed in organic laws but the psychology of men. Since human feelings
were different in the N Drth and the South, histDry took a different course in
the two areas.
Economic improvement through work-the gDal of the people in the
North-demanded peace and the expansion of the United States from the
Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexioo, from the Atlantic Coast t0' the P,acific.
Thus, people have been Dn the move since the early days of independence,
but the United States fought only one major war in the first century of its
existence, a war to preserve the unity of the nation.
The ruling classes of Latin America, on the contrary, had nothing to gain
:frDm unificatiDn of their continent. They were better off with a dozen or
more capitals, each with a sovereign head of state, each sovereign surrounded
by his own court with diplomats and generals, each a source of privileges,
lucrative appointments and honors" each tied by blood with the best local
lamilies. Why should the m'a sters of the land sacrifice these advantages to
Bolivar's dreams of unity for Latin America? Thus, the area was divided
among a dozen independent states, and the struggle for pDwer among local
rulers resulted in a chain of border dashes. Relations among the sister
republics degenerated into protracted wars Df each against all.
During the first century of independence, some Latin American republics
enjoyed con~iderable periods 0'£ pDlitical stability under the regime of a
president or dictator strong enough tD crush all opposition. But intervals
of peace were ·followed by outbursts of violence and revolutions. Bolivia
13

experienced 60 revolutions within a century and had seven presidents in the
1936-46 decade. Colombia lost 100,000 lives in the famous Thousand Day
ReV'olution, and another 100,OO~acoording to local estimates--fell as victims
of political murders and terror in the late '40s and early '50s. The history of
Venezuela, Peru ,a nd Argentina is equally stained in blood.
Such reigns of violence were, of course, detrimental to the development
of modern economic civilization, but the ruling classes were well off and
satisfied with the status quo. It took a long time before new social groups
appeared on the Latin American scene as champions of equaHty, social
justice and economic progress. The history of Latin America in the 19th
century-with continuous clashes of brutal force, wars, revolutions, seizures
of power, elected presidents becoming ruthless dictators and bloody dictators
transforming themselves into elected presidents-was colorful and dramatic
but void of internal ,d ynamism. It brought little change in the social fabric
and economic structure ·of the respective nations, and little improvement in
the standard of living of the masses. In comparison with the changes which
took place in this period in North America and Northwestern Europe, the
19th century in Latin America was a time of economic and social stagnation,
the Dark Age of the Southern Hemisphere.
Beginning of the New Era: By the tur,n of the century, things began to
change. New waves of immigrants were reaching the shores of Latin America,
bringing new blood and new ideas. Foreign capital penetrated the area,
bringing railroads, electricity, modern utilities. Physicians, architects, educators and journalists, some of them with French 't raining, became more
conspicuous on the social scene of Latin American cities. Although closely
connected with the old ruling classes, the intellectuals became -spokesmen
for the middle classes-businessmen and craftsmen-slowly emerging from
the aristocratic society. New members joined the old triad of landowner,
priest and soldier-the intellectual, the businessman, the professional politician' all risen fro,m a humble environment to mingle with the descendants
of the landowner families. The old social pyramid began to crack. Surely
it would be absurd to speak of the Spanish triad as the ruling force in

A BUILDING AT THE ·NATIONAL UNIVERSITY O'F MEXICO. MEXICO CITY

Brazil, Mexico or Chile at the time of W orld War I, though this pattern
of power prevails even now in some other Latin American republics.
The transformation, slow and spotty at the beginning, was accelerated
during and after World War 1. The middle classes became more articulate,
their influence increased. The weight of the intellectuals and middle classes
in Latin America today is evidenced by the high standards of local newspapers. The material they publish-serious political and economic articles,
literary essays, surveys of local and international art-would find no readers
in a society that consisted of a self-sufficient nobility and masses of illiterate
serfs. It is enough to examine the leading newspapers in Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay, Chile, Colomlb ia and Mexico to realize that ,t hey address themselves
to steadily growing social groups and are at the same time their spokesmen.
The intellectuals in Latin America are essentially carriers of liberal, democratic ideas. They initiated modern labor legislation after W orId War I,
in faithful accordance with the suggestions of the International Labor Office.
What is more important, they tried to improve the educational system and
modernize public administration in the more advanced republics. But customs
and attitudes raoted in centuries do not change radically in a couple of
decades. Thus, Latin America today rem·a ins a mixture of ·m odern aspirations
a,nd old prej udices. The m,o st striking manifestation of the clash between
modern times and the colonial heritage is the state of its educational
institutions. The magnificent National University of Mexico is second to
no university eampus in the world. But one has to travel to' Southeast Asia
or Egypt Ito observe such miserable -r ural schools or such a lack .of village
schools as in some Latin American countries.
The war for liberation from the colonial heritage is still being fought
in Latin America. It is heing fought on the ideological and cultuJial levels
. rather than by force of arms. The progress of the campaign is marked
by clearing the area O'f dictators, consolidating democratic regimes, modernizing ways of life. The drive for industrializatiO'n is one of the many
aspects of this campaign, a parlt o.f the 'refresh~ng new Latin American nationalism which is not sufficiently understood in the United States.

A RURAL SCHOOL BUILT BY PEASANTS UNDER THE SELF·AID PROGRAM

3. Problems of Economic Growth
of national develO'pment plans is taken fO'r granted in
Latin America, but we could find nO' such plans in the countries we
visited. The failure was due partly to language difficulties. What the local
economists described as plans or programs are neither in the sense we use
these terms. They are, rather, enumerations of good intentions by the respective agencies, without any commitments or any indication of the sources
of the needed funds.
Each Latin American country has, of course, many prO'j eets in different
branches of ecO'nomics, public welfare, administration, regional development
and so fO'rth. Some of them are in the initial phase; others have been developed with engineering details. Some are ephemeral; others evidence vision
and great ability on the part of local technicians. But one seldom hears of
an integrated plan which would coordinate individual projeots and dovetail
them with available resources. Since neither sound nor fantastic projoots can
be launched without funds, the shortage of capital appears to local economists
as the decisive faotor which deprives the people of the good things envisaged
in pending plans.
Capital. Clue to Prosperity: The gap between isolated projects and integrated planning may be partly responsible for the widespread notion among
Latin American intellectuals that their countries are primarily handicapped
by insufficient private capital formation, the lack of public funds, and the
reluotance of foreign capitalists and governments to advance them loans and
credit on the necessary scale and acceptable terms.
Putting aside the question of foreign cred~ts, I do not believe that a low
rate of capital formation explains the shortage of funds for produotive invesbnent in Latin Amerioa. Indeed, ·t he amount of private and public capital
available for such investment depends on three main factors: the surplus of
incomes over current oonsumption; the way in which this surplus is used;
and the share of the national product available to public authorities for productive use. In Latin America, with its striking conJtrast between luxury
and destitution, the shortage of funds for investment is due largely, I believe, to the way in which the rich use their incomes. Their standard of living,
o:£ten extravagant in oomparison with the economic level of ·their cO'untry,
leaves them liule for saving. And, even if they cannot cO'nsume all their
income, they have no incentive to invest the surplus in enterprises which
would increase national productive capacity.
A United States observer is surprised to see the lavishness of the private
residences an,d public buildings in and around Latin American capitals. In
Bogota, Colombia, we drove past a group of luxurious buildings encircled
by lovely gaTdens. We were told this was the Army officers' club built by
the former dictator Roj as Pinilla. This -splash of splendor far outshone the
modest ' Army and Navy Building in Washington. In charmingly quiet
Quito, Ecuador, we saw private mansiO'ns resembling oastles of the Old World,
surrounded by brick-and-iron fences. In a long row of pretentious private

T

16

HE EXISTENCE

houses, we saw one with a gilded roof. In Lima, Peru, we were invited to a
plushy club in a palace-like building of a style rarely encountered in the
United States. In the suburbs of Santiago, Chile, we drove along endless avenues of private residences; they unwittingly proclaimed that huge amounts
of capital had been diverted from pro,ductive purposes for a display of vanity.
Latin America is studded with the abandoned foundations of stadiums
and theaters, hydroelectric dams without powerhouses, irrigation dams without irrigation canals, highways without feeders. Other ambitious development plans are collecting dust on shelves in the archives. Some projects
were dropped because of a change in the administration. A project is usually
launched under the auspices of a president, minister, governor or influential
poHtician and becomes associated with his name. But its initiator may disappear from the politioal scene before the projeot is completed, and his

LUXURY APARTMENTS BUILT IN BUENOS AIRES UNDER JUAN PERON

successor usually prefers to start something new, bigger and better, bearing
his own name. The cumulative value of projects started and abandoned
in this m,a nner may be staggering. A waste of capital also results from
emphasis on ,t he colossal and spectacular. A luxurious airport often gets
priority over the rehabilitation of railroads. Splendid apartment buildings for
a few are rated higher than slum clearance.
To these forms of unproductive investment and wasted oapital, we must
add psychological factofis. For a prospective investor, there is more glamor
in becoming a landowner or expanding his estate tha,n in run-rung a factory
or a store. Investment in land speculation is, of course, one .of the worst uses
of capital from the point of view of -t he national economy, but it is encouraged by the lack of oonrtinuity in government policy. Nothing short of a social
revolution would deprive the landowner or land speculator of his wealth,
while changes in government, whether by constitutional means or by violence,
may jeopardize all other investments.
17

To sum up, the slow movement of productive investment in Latin America
depends less Qn a shortage of capital than Qn patterns in its use-in other
words, more on the at6tude of the people po.ssessing money than on an
insufficient surplus of current national product over consumption. This is
an encQuraging conclusion. The propensities and business psychology responsible for such inefficient uses of capital belong to the heritage of the
pre-capitalist, colonial era. They are gradually giving way to a new psychology, a new system o.f economic motivations and decisions. This is a long
. process, a part of a social and economic transfo.rmation of the South that
began before Wo.rld W,a r I and is no'w in a fairly advanced stage. Its acceleration may be CQnfidently expected.
Four Obstacles to Progress: As I have tried to show, the rate of economic
growth and the level o.f economic development vary widely from country
to country in Latin America. No general statement of the reasons that economic progress l,ags in this area is possible because there is no such lag in
Mexioo, Brazil or Puerto Rico, and the causes of stagnation in Argentina
are not the same as those of slQW progress in Chile. However, certain features characteristic of the Latin American economic scene appear in various
co.mbinations in several countries that l,a g behind other parts of the continent, and can be described as roadblocks to. economic pro.gress.
In CQntrast to. a widespread notion, I do not believe that the rapid growth
o.f the pO'pulation and its excessive density should be considered an obstacle
to. economic progress. In different parts of Latin America., there is no appreci.able cQrrelation between the density of po.pulation or its rate of growth
on O'ne hand, and the level of economic development and pace of economic
progress on the other. Also, ,t here is not much correlation between the
potential natural resources and the pDOgresS in their utilization.
Apart from the inefficient use of capital, the following are, in my opinion,
the most formidable roadblocks on the road of economic progress in certain
parts of Latin America:
• Lack of political srtabil~ty, excessive centralization of government, and,
especially, the dictato.rial regimes.
• Lack of stability of the national currency and galloping inflation.
• Lack of educational facilities for the m.asses of the people, par.t icularly
in ruml areas.
• A dual eC01Ilomy--1:hat is, the absence of coordination between different
ecO'nomic sectors, especially between urban and rural sectors.
Dictators: Dictatorship is a perennial problem in Latin America. Just
now this form of government is at low ebb, and O'nly three or fo.ur fullfledged. diotators are o.n the scene, with the danger of a relapse to. dicta,toTship in a few other countries. But the conditio.ns leading to' the concentration
of power in the hands of an irresponsible individual have not been CQmpletely eliminated, and the problem of the impact of dictatorship on economic
progress deserves serious consideration.
Latin American diotators appear to be ardent promO'ters of industrialization.
They subsidize industry, enco.urage foreign trade, initiate the building 01
highways, invite foreign capilta!. Their era is often marked by the con18

struction of palaces and public buildings in the capital. But usually they
leave their country in economic ruin.
The example of Argentina is enlightening. This was ,t he richest country
in Latin America when Peron wa,s elected president. In 1948, when he had
grasped dictatorial power, Argentina's national income 'a mounted to $5.4
billion (at 1950 prices). If that country had been permitted to develop as
other nations of the continent did-not quite .as rapidly as Brazil or Mexico
but, 'say, ra t a flate of 4 per cent a year-it would have reached an income
of 50me $7.4 billion (at 1950 prices) by 1957. Instead, its 1957 income
amounted to less than $5 billion, and its cumulative loss in national incQome
from 1948 ,t hrough 1957 was approximately $10 billion. And to, this hypothetioal loss must be added two items: first, the funds appropriated by the
dictator . .for him-self, his family and political friends; seoond, the funds he
wasted or used for self-glorification.
Diotatorship is expensive. The profession of a diotaJtor is hazardous, and
he must think of the future. It is tOiO late for him to begin tOo pack his valuables when opposition planes are droning over his palace. A nest egg must
theref.ore -b e set aside and transferred to a safe place in advance. Argentine
economists estimate that Peron had hundreds of million of dollars in banks
in the Uni,t ed States -a nd Switzerland when he fled the country.
The impact of a dictatorial regime on the national economy is strengthened
by the technique of handling public funds. Straight stealing may be possible
in small countries hut would be considered had manners in larger ones. In
the latter, dictators aot in accordance with laws and regulaltions. Competent
lawyers in Buenos Aires .a ssured me that i,t was douhtful whether an independent court oould convict Peron for his financial transaotions, which oonsisted, in the m-a in, of land speculation, juicy government contracts, import
and export operations---all in ,a ccord with laws and regulations he himself
had promulgated.
A monumental style .of public buildings is characteristic of dictatorial regimes. One is am-azed by v.ast halls, triumphal approaches, colonnaded
fa~adesand heroic statues within and without the buildings erected by dictators. Local architects are not to blame for this extravagance. A diotatQor requires that they use huge amounts of cement, ooncrete, stone and other
materials usually provided by oonoerns controlled by him or his relatives
and friends. The system of licenses and monopolies in f.oreign trade, another
favorite policy of dictators, operates similarily.
But the worst impaot of a diot:atorial regime on economic development is
that it makes politics the surest and easiest way toward rapid enrichment,
as in colonial days. Why should one invest money in -a business that requ.ir.~
~teady work and promises a return of some 10 per cent a year when there
are opportunities to opeflate with bo,r rowed money and ~n no time double
one's capital by shrewd use of licenses and inside information ? Yet, we did
meet people who had tesi1sted such temptations. In Mendoza, a prosperous
city in the center of the grape-raising and winemaking region in the interior
of Argentina, we visited a faotory manufacturing heavy chemicals, that had
been esta.blished as 'a partnership by a group of local engineers and pro19

cessed raw materials supplied by small mines situated around Mendoza. The
manager showed us the plant. It wars built with an investment of $500,000,
pl'lO'fits were reinvested, and ,a t the time of our visit the book value of the
enterprise was $2.5 million. After a tour of the plant and laboratories, we
visited the workshop, which resembled a tremendous barn or garage, .'w ith
acres of idle benches and lathes. Only a dDzen workers were busy in .this
shop. "This is where we build machines and equipment for our plant and
mines," the m'a nager explained.
"How many pieces of each model do you need ? Would it not be more
economical to' imPDrt your equipment?" I asked.
He smiled: "What we dO' here would be absurd under no'r mal conditions,
but it is the only sensible way to' run a plant in O'ur circumstances. We do
not wish to' ,a sk for import licenses. They would cost us more in time and
money than to build the necessary machines with our own means. Our pDlicy
has paid."
In the same city we met with members of the looa1 federation of businessmen. I asked the president: "What does your cO'untry need for economic
development?" He replied without hesitation: "Freedom and sound government."
"Then you dO' no,t believe that capital is the most urgent need in Argentina?"
"No, sir. We could raise all the capital we need in Mendoz'a. What we
need is a climate in which enterprises can thrive withO'u.t fear of arbitrary
action by the government."
Under a dictatorial regime an industrialist faces the choice between playing
ball with the government and making m'oney on m,a nipulations with licenses,
currency, doubtful partnerships and sO' forth, or trying to isolate himself
from the omnipotent state as the courageous men in ·Mendoza did.
I have mentiDned only the economic impaots of a dictatorial .regime. Its
impact on education on all levels, from the rural school to the universities,
and on family life and political morale is ,no less destruotive, but these que tions 'a re outside the scope of this study.
.
Inflation: Along with political factors~~ currency instability)•and inflation
are important obstacles to' ,economic progress'in some parts'of L~tin America.
I use "inflation" not in the broad sense in which it is used in sOme United
Nations p~bliC'ations, where each rise 'of prices is handled ,a s inflaJtion, but in
a narrower sense, as a rapid depreciation of national currency caused by the
monetary, ' fiscal and credit· polIcies ' of the government. Almost ail Latin
American cO'untries' have experienced this type of infl.ation· at some time in
their histO'ry, though it is not a common 'economic disease in the region today.
Only a few cO'1.1Thtries-Peru, Bol~via and Chile-are currently suffering from
galloping deterioration of currency. Their experience deserves particular
attention beoause what happens there cDuld easily occui'in' 11alf dDzen other
Latin American co'u ntries.
' .
;,
Chile is a classic example. It is one of the best developed .countries in the
area-not only economically but also politically, socially 'and culturally. But
inflation has been Chile's major p'rdblerhslnce the 1880s and' has become'
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a way of life, a kind of national tradition in the eyes of local economists.
The U. S. dollar was worth about 8 Chilean pesos in 1929, 31 pesos in 1939
and 99 pesos in 1949 on the free market. After a bdef 'Spell of r overy in
1950-51, the Chilean peso resumed its downhill movemept. A aoUar brought
220 pesos on the :free market in 1953, 315 pesos in 1954, 630 pesos in 1955
and 777 in May 1958*.
Chilean economists are aware of the destructive effect of this development on the national economy, but some of them are inclined to justify the
progressive depreciation of the natiO'nal currency, arguing that inflation
stimulates capital formation and is unavoidable in pedocls of rapid economi
e~pansion. To my mind, they 'a re viotims of an -illusion.
The rate of recent econO'mic progress in Chile has nO't been very impressive.
Official statistics estimate the average annual increment of real income frO'm
1940 to' 1954 at 2.3 per cent per capita of populatiO'n, or 2.1 per cent per
person engaged in active work. For the decade after World War II, the
corresponding rates were 1.7 and 1.5 per cent. No comparable statistics are
available fur the period since 1954, when inflation has been particularly
violent and very little progress has been recorded in the national 8COIIlomy.
The average annual gain in real product per worker in the period 1944-57
was hardly more than 1 per cent if one accepts official statistios at face value.
Moreover, estimates of real national income under conditions of galloping
inflation fail to record the deterioration in the quality of products which
usually accompanies depreciation of currency.
Nowhere is the disastrous effect of inflation combined w1th government
control over lorei'gn trade as clear as in Chile. Local businessmen, natives
and foreigners, told me that 4.5 per cent per month wa1s the normal interest
on capital in U.S. dollars. Such was the interest on money deposited w1th
customs authorities by exporters, a oompletely legal and safe operation. If
one was ready to accept a little risk-with regard to a possible change of
government, for example-the interest might be 7.5 per cent a month. A
looal industrialist described his predicament. He had a flourishing business
and needesl it loan of $100,000 to expand it. Having exhausted his political
pull, he lapplied for ,a private loan. The prospective credi,t or had a ready
answer: "I "o,a n get monthly interest, of 7.5 per cent with practically no risk.
How mu~ , more wHI you give -m e?" And the industrialist remarked sadly:
"1£ I pay, him 100 per cent interest, what win be left for me?"
It is also noteworthy that, under conditions of galloping inflation 'a,nd government control over foreign trade, the success of export-import operations
does not neCessarily depend on the ' difference between the oost of the' merchandise (including operational expenses) and the sale price. What counts is
the difference between the actual value of exported and imported goods and
their evaluation at the custO'ms.
In brief, the cO'mbination O'f unoontrolled infl.ation with government cO'ntrol
of foreign trade disorganizes the economic system to' such an extent that its
• The effort. or the last President of Chlle, Carlos Ibanez, to .top or slow down the galloping inflation were
fruatrated by the preasure or busineumen and political circles. A stronger anti-inflationary policy is universally

expected Crom the new Preaidont, Jor,e Mellandri.
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expansion becomes very difficult, if not impossible. The oontention -that inflation accelerates oapital {tormaHon rests on a misunderstanding of historical
facts. In the situation Germany faced after World War I, runaway -inflation
served capital formation by expropriating the middle classes and-transferring
their wealth to ruthless and unscrupulous but dynamic and shrewd operators.
When there are no Stinneses on the scene and infl·a tion is effected for the
benefit of speculators with the psychology of easy-going- lei's ure cl,asses, it
slows down oapital formation rather than accelerates it.
Illiteracy: Lack of universal education and the illiteracy of a large part of
the population, especially in rur,al areas, also hold back economic progress
in some parts of Latin America.
The simplest indicator of the educational level in a country is, perhaps, the
percentage of illiterate persons in the populatio,n. Because illiteracy is a rare
phenomenon in modern, economically developed nations, most of them - do
not record liter,acy in their censuses. But most of the Latin American oountries
include this query and record everybody who can read a line of large print
and sign his name as "literate." The percentages of i1literacy in:·Latin
Amerioan countries, accoTding to this definition, are shown below in Table IV.
Argentina ·a nd Chile come cl,osest to universal prim,a ry ' education, followed
by Costa Rica, Cuba, Puerto Rioo and Panama. Brazil has surprisingly high
illiteracy. Of the countries not listed above, Mexico probably Tanks close to
the middle of the list, Peru close to the bottom, and Uruguay close to the top.
But literacy as defined by the censuses d·oog not mean much. Many children
enroll in the first grade at the age of 7 and leave school at the age of 8 or 9.
IV. IIliferacy in Lafin America, 1950
Population aged 10 and over

Population agecJ:15~20

(Percentages)

Argentina . ....................... .
Chile ........ ........... , ........ .
Costa Rica ....................... .
Cuba ............................ .
Puerto Rico ...................... .
Panama .......................... .
Paraguay ............. " .......... .
Colombia ........................ .
Ecuador ...... , ...... .. , .. , " '..... .
Venezuela ........................ .
Brazil ............................ .
Dominican Republic ............... .
EI Salvador ....................... .
Honduras ........................ .
Bolivia ........................... .
Guatemala ....................... .
Haiti ............................ .

13.3 a
19.9
21.2
23.6
25.6
28.2
31.8
38.6
43.7
51.1 c
51.4
56.9
57.8
66.3 c
68.9 4
70.3
89.3

a 14 years and over. b 14-29 years. c 7 yeau and over. 45 years and over.
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, .1957.
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8.3 b
13.9
18.4
22.5
20.3
20.4
22;.7
31.4
34.7
42.6
47.2

46.6
56.6
63.1
57.3
68.0
86.4

School Attendance in Brazil Iby ,g radel
Grades

No. of pupils

College

21,928

Twerfth

42,255

Eleventh

61.426

Tenth

88.472

Ninth

95,548

Eighth

128,947

Seventh

174,892

Sixth

230,567

Fourth &Fifth 466,957
Third

735,116

Second

1,075,792

First

2,664,121

I
I
tl
tl
II
tt,
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tttt,

t· ...-

IIUttl •• ,
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In Brazil, for example, less than one-sixth of children enrolled in the first
grade reach the fourth grade of the elementary school and less than 1 per
cent gO' as far as the eleventh grade, as cQmpared with 75 per cent in the
United States. This pyramid of school attendance by age is characteristic of
the social structure of the natiQn. And conditions are better in Brazil than
in many other Latin American countries. At least, the Ministry of Education
in RiO' de Janeiro is fully aware of the crucial importance of the problem of
elementary education and is trying to attract public attention to it.
Throughout Latin America, illiteracy is heavily concentrated in ,t he villages.
In countries where more than '50 per cent of the population is illiterate, a
.farmer whO' can read, write 'a nd count is a rare exception. The lack of
'elementary education in villages i,s the greatest obstacle 1:0 the development of
:ihdependerit farms with diversified produotion which could supply the dQmestic market. NO' land reform can create such farms unless a decisive effort is
made to cover the oQuntryside with an adequate network of primary schoQls.
In this respect the situation is grim, indeed, in SQnie parts of Latin America.
Many villages have no school. In others, the Qne small school is reserved for
the boOys; since c'o education is a sin in the eyes of the local priest, girls are not
admitted. In some villages, schools are housed in miserable adobe huts withQut ' windows, with teachers who appear as destitute as the villagers around
them. The highest tribute to these teachers is that, with practically nO' school
equipment, they succeed in giving their barefooted little students at least a
first glimpse ' of knowledge. We found the exercise books of pupils in good
shape even in the poorest schQols; their writings and figuring, drawings and
' sketches of maps were surprisingly good. But it was difficult to realize that the
' children whom we saw in these pathetic rooms represented the elite of rural
areas': ' The majority of the children were left outside the school.
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When we spoke of It he detrimental effect of m,ass illiteracy on economic
progress before a group of economists, they were skeptical. A young and very
ahle economist d"idiculed my argument. "Education has no economic value
in the villages," he said. "A big hacienda owner told me that the only work
he demands .of his hands is to cut sugar cane with a machette, and he has
never noticed that a literate worker does it better than an illiterate one." In
Brazil, we heard another argument: "When we build a factory," a professor
of economics said, "we are meating a new source of national income. But
when we build a new school, we call to life an additional demand for further
annual outlays."
We also heard a similar argument in another form: "A poor country Call a
not do much to improve its agriculture, but it can develop its industry. All
our efforts must be ooncentl'iated on the urban sector as the most dynamic~
flexible and responsive. Later, new ways of life and knowledge will penetrate
from the cities into the villages, by a process of 'contamination'." We also
met, of course, people who saw the relationship between education and economic progress in the same perspective -a s we did.
I found it difficult to explain to our Latin American friends the impact
of universal education on economic progress in the United States. A Who's
Who olf business in the United States sho,ws that only a few of the leaders of
our big concerns have inherited their position. Most have climbed the ladder
from the bottom. Efficient operation of a modern economic system is impossible in a country if managerial functions are distributed among wealthy
families and no new blood from the rest of the nation flows to the managerial
class. This is precisely what i,s happening in some parts of Latin America as
a result of the lack of adequate education f.or all citizens. It is not impossible
there to rise from the position of a manual laborer or farmer to the top of
the social pyr,amid, hut the man who does so is a raTe exception.
The Dual Economy: The contrasts in the distribution of income and knowledge, combined wilt h the traditional domination of the villages by the cities
and aggravated in some cases by the antiquated system of landlordism, have
esulted in the perpetuation of -a dual eco,noJmy in Latin Ameriea. A large
part of the rural population lives its own life, isolated from the monetized
economy represented by the comparatively prosperous cities. Absence of an
adequate domestic market prevents the development of mass production and
threatens to frustrate the effo-r ts to expand domestic industry.
Rehabilitation of poverty-ridden villages is, to some ~tent, a regional
problem. It appears to be a problem of the south in Mexico, Argentina and
Chile, of western areas in Colombia and Ecuador, of the great river basins
and northeastern bulge of Brazil, and so on. In Isome countries, among them
Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, the problem of a dual economy merges wi·t h the
problem of racial integration.
In one form or another, the evils of the dual economy are gaining increasing attention among economists in Mexico and Brazil, but the crucial significance of the problem has not been fully recognized. Latin American economic
policy still emphasizes industry and exports rather than agriculture and the
domestic market and results in accentuating the cont'rast between compar%4
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pro.spero.US and less developed provinces. In this respect, the economic
thinking in some parts of Latin America reminds me of a dandy who. has discovered that his toes show through hi-s shoes-and tries to improve his appearance by buying a new silk hat. .

4. Trade and Foreign Aid

T

HE economic policy of the United States in Latin America-and in more
general terms, the fo.reign economic policy of any great nation in any
area-may be nonveniently examined under two hroad headings: trade and
aid. The first includes the excha,nge of goods plus the mo.vement of private
capital (investments) and the exohange nf services (transPO'Jr tation, to.urism,
and the like). The seoond comprises public grants, development and
emergency loans, technical assistance and similar measures, either in the
form O'f unilateral transfers or on the hasis of bilateral nr multilateral cooperation. For the United States, it also includes this country's contrihutions
to United Nations assistance programs in Latin Amerioa.
In hoth areas, the PO'licy of the United States is necessarily determined
by its national interest. National interest, however, is a sO'mewhat ambiguous
term. It covers: (1) the direct interest of American businessmen whO' continually claim protection nn the domestic market and ahrnad, O'ccasionally
in disregard of the interests of other groups of the population; and (2) the
long-run interest of the nation as a whole, which may oO'nflict with the immediate interests of certain groups of the population. An inclusive, internally
consistent fDreign economic policy requires reconciliation of hoth points of
VIew.
The development nf such a program fDr the United States in Latin America
depends on two premises: first, clear understanding of the environment in
which the program will operate (the level and trends of eoonomic development
of Latin America, the urgent needs of its people, the patterns of its fo.reign
trade, the rO'le of foreign capital, the extent and nature of the foreign aid it
now receives, and sO' on) ; second, a clear definition of the aims and objectives
of the United States in this area.
This chapter endeavors to clarify the environment in which our foreign
economic policy must operate in Latin America; the next chapter will explore
the ohjectives of our economic policy in this area and outline a program
which, in my opinion, would conform with hoth U. S. national interests and
looal conditions.
Foreign Trade: Because of ,t he relatively small size of the Latin Amerioan
republics ' and the lopsided development of their economy, none of them
enjoys the same degree of self-sufficiency as the United States or such nations
as Germany, France and Italy. This fact appears clearly in the ratio of the
value of foreign trade (th sum of expoTts and imports) to national income.
In mGst Latin American countries, this ratio fluctuates between 40 and 60
per cent. In the tiny republics of Central Amerioa and in Cuba, the DO'minian Republic, Venezuela, .Peru and EcuadO'r, this ratio ranges from 60 to
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v. Foreign Trade,
Country

Millionsof$

IMPORTS
%of national income

7956
Mi /lions of $

EXPORTS
%of national income

22
25
39
46
35
51
9

Mexico . .. ... . .....
Guatemala .. ... . . . .
EI Salvador . ...... . ... .
Nicaragua ... .... ... . . .
Honduras ....... .. .
Costa Rica ...... .... .
Panama .... . .. . . . ...

978
138
105
69
59
91
"83

44

688
106
113
58
73
64
17

Cuba . .. . . . . ............
Dominican Republic .
Haiti . .............. . ...... .

570
108
47

35
32
14

666
125
43

40
36
13

Venezuela . ...... ........ . 1,026
Colombia .. . . . . . .. . 657
Ecuador .... ...... . . .... . ..
81
Peru .... . . .... .... .... ........
361
Bolivia ( 1955) ........
8f'
Paraguay ..... ,. ... ... ..
95
Chile ..... . ...............
354
Argentina ... . .... ..... 1,128
Brazil . .......... . ...... . 1,234
Uruguay .... . . . . . ....
206

30
22
19
40
27
17
17
22
10
29

2,122
537
94
308
98
37
546
944
1,482
211

70
18
22
34
32
24
27
19
12
30

31
33
37
60
28
73

S ources : UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957 and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956, Vol. I.

80 per cent; it is comparatively low, under 30 per cent, in Haiti and Brlazil.
Comparable figures are ,appro.ximately 10 per cent for the United States,
20-30 per cent for West Germany, France and Italy.
Thus, foreign trade is much more important to Latin American nations
than to' the United States. Indeed, the area as a who.le relies O'n imports not
only for capital goods and articles consumed by wealthy peO'ple in the cities,
but also. fo.r textiles, SDme staple foods, petroleum products, cO'al, met'a ls and
chemicals. It c9ver~ these imports with exports o.f coffee, cocoa, bananas
and sugar; meat," wool and other animal products; crude petroleum, CDpper,
"lead, zinc and tin ores, wolframite and saltpeter; cotton and sisal. Export
industries, especially the activities 0'£ large 'plantations and mining, dominate
the Latin American economy. The uneven distribution of natural resources
within the continent has determined the composition and, to' some extent, the
direction of the fDreign trade 0.£ individual countries. In "m any cases a single
i!t em predominates in the country's export. In contrast, the list of imported
goods is much longer and varies little from country to country.
Almost all Latin American countries report a higher value O'f exports than
of impo.rts: that is, an active balance in merchandise trade. This may be.
due to' the fact that they have to. pay for transporting their products in foreign
bottoms. Some Latin American economists complain that their countries are
compelled to pay high prices for imported goods and are underpaid when
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Exports as Percent of Total Exports •

Ha iti ........ .. . _iI§~~I~i~illlill~21i22~llilliilillilN1
Brazil ..... .... _±£ill~~~~1i21i21i2ii20J2±21
Cuba .... ... ... b· if@[~~]iifEillill11ill~~~lIITfEi12§jill]

_ 2]82

Chile . ······· ·· ...: iiiiiiiio..........:....................~

Bolivia . .... ...: ;;;,;,;,;.;,;,;_....
Honduras ..

*1957

they market their products. The facts, however, do. nO't substantiate this complaint. As a rule, Latin America pays world prices fO'r foreign products
and obtains world prices for exported goods. The exorbitant prices which
local consumers pay for imported articles in retail markets result largely
frO'm high import duties, the high rates of interest prevailing in Latin America,
and similar factors.
There is no doubt, however, that Latin American countries are affected
unfavO'rably by excessive fluctuatiDns in the prices of their basic products.
Changes in the prices Df oDffee, tin or copper that oause only a ripple in the
United States may exercise a deep impaot on the economy .of a small nation
which depends heavily on expDrt of one O'f these products.
The Geographical Pattern: Latin America's resentment of its precarious
pDsitiDn on the wDrld market is directed primarily against the United States.
There is no evidence, of course, that Yankee merchants charge higher prices
for their goods or offer .less fDr Latin A.m erican pr<>ducts than dO'merchants
of other natiDns, but for Latin America the United States is the main outlet
for local products and the main source Df supply fDr machinery, autO'mO'biles,
household appliances and other imported articles. In 1956 the United States
accounted for 46 per cent of the value of all exports from Latin America and
for 50.3 per cent .of all impO'rts intO' that area. Its share in the export of
merchandise from Latin American countries varies widely-from 11.6 per
cent in Uruguay to 94.8 per cent in Banama-while its quota in imports
ranges from 13.4 per cent in landlocked Paraguay to' 78.2 per cent in Mexico,
our closest neighbO'r in the South.
The variation in our share in exports of individual Latin American countries depends mainly on what they can offer. We take the largest part of their
export of sugar, ooffee, bananas, crude petroleum and metal ores, but have
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little use for their cottOon, meat and woool. In imports, on the other hand, the
United States faces many competitors in the Latin American market: Great
Britain, West Germany, Japan la nd, for some articles, France, Switzerland,
Italy and the Scandinavian countries. Our m'a in advantage is that our ports
are closer to Latin America-a faot that has less weight in Argentina, Uru·g uay
and Brazil than in Central America, the Caribbean and on the Pacific COoast
of South America. Excluding Argentina and Uruguay, which have stronger
ties with Europe than with nations in this hemisphere, the United States accounts for 72.,5 per cent of all export'S and 51.5 per cent of all imports Oof Latin
America. (See Table VI, opposite page.)
Latin America accounts for 20-25 per cent Oof U. S. exports and nearly one
third of its imports. Its share in our exports has been steadily increasing
since the turn of the century; its share in our imports skyrocketed during
W orId War II and has declined slightly in recent years:
r--Share 01 Latin America in
Exports

Average
1891-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921 - 1930
1931-1940
1941-1950
1951-1955

U.S.~

Imports
27.4
25.4
31.2
26.0
24.1
37.6
33.2

9.5
12.0
13.0
15.3
17.0
18.3
22.4

The exchange of goods between Latin American republics represents only
a small fraction of their foreign trade. It accOounted for the following percentages of exports. from Latin American countries and of world exports to
these countries:
From latin America . .. . . . . . . .... .. .
To latin America . . . . .... . .. .. . . . .

1953

1954

1955

1956

9.5
12.0

9.1
10.5

9.5
11.0

7.8
9.0

Latin America is not an economic unit which meets its needs mainly through
its own production and the interchange of products within its borders, as
does Europe or North America. Trade among the Latin American countries
is made difficult by geographical conditions, lack of adequate transportatiop
and also partly by historical factors. The area has not freed itself completely
frDm the heritage of the colonial era, which left an economy oriented tDward
exports rather than satisfaction of domestic needs. At the time of our visit
to Latin Ameriea, local newspapers and economists showed a considerable
interest in the idea of a Latin American common market which would
strengthen the economic unity of the area by stimulating trade between the
sister-republic'S. Such a development would be desirable for many reasons,
but it would require a drastic reorientation of the domestic eCDnomic policies
of Latin American governments. Their present industrialization policies,
which often encourage ,the same industries in all parts of the continent, are
not f.avOor~ble ~o its:, economic",unification on the basi of division of labor.
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VI. U.S. Share In Trade, 1956

------ u.s. % 0110101 -------..
Country

Exports

Panama .. . . ........ . . . .. . .. . . . .... .. . . ... 94.S
Guatemala .. . . . . ... . . .. . .. .. .. . .. . . . . .... 74.1
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 72.9
Colombia .. .. . . . . . ..... .. .. . . .. . ... . . . .. . 71 .4
Cuba . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. .. 64.7
Honduras .. .. .... . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . 64. 1
Ecuador ... . .... . . . . ..... . ... . .. .... . .. . . 59.5
Bolivia . . . . . . . . .. ..... . .. . . .. .. ..... .. . . .. 55.4
Brazil . . ... . .. ... .. . . ... .. . . ... . . . ... . .. .. 49.6
Costa Rica .. . . ..... . . . .. . . .. . ..... . . .. .. . 48.1
Dominican Republic . .. .. ... . .. .. .. . . . .. . . . 46.8
EI Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.6
Chile . . . . .. . ... . . .. .. . . . . . . . ..... ...... .. 42.4
Venezuela .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. ... . . . .. ...... . 39.5
Peru ... . .... ... ..... . ..... . . . . . . .... ... . . 36.8
Haiti . . . . ..... . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. .... . ... . . . 34.1
Paraguay . . .. . ....... .. . . ... . . . .. . . ...... IS. I
Argentina . . . . ... . . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . ...... . 12.5
Uruguay . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . ... .... . . ...... 11.6

Imports
60.0
64.1
78.2
61.6
76.2
73.8
52.0
57.9
28.8
51.7
65.9
52.6
42.9
59.1
49.5
62.1
13.4
IS.O
15.9

Source: UN Yearbook of Internation al Trade Sta tistics , 1956, Vol. I.

There are indications that Latin American countries are moving toward
a greater diversification of 't heir agriculture and industry, designed to substitute domestic products for imported goods to some extent. This tendency
will change both the composition and direction of the foreign trade 0.£ the
continent. It will hardly stimulate trade among Latin American countries
but may contribute to an expansion of their trade with Europe and Asia
while reducing, at the same time, their dependence on the United States. In
the long run, such a tendency would be in the interest of both the United
States and Latin America. The latter would strengthen its position on the
world market while the United States would be freed of the oharge of monopolistic or semi-monopolistic domination of Latin American markets.
The share of the USSR in the Latin A.m erican foreign trade is not impressive: In 1955, exports of Latin American countries to the USSR, the East
European satellites and China totaled $115 million, a little less than 1.4 per
cent of their total exports. Imports ·f rom Communist-dominated countries
into Latin America were of similar magnitude. The Soviets have m·a de some
inroads in Latin American markets recently, but the Iron Curtain countries
account for hardly more than 3 per cent of the foreign commerce of the
area.
Summing up, Latin Amerioa is a very important partner in the intraregional trade of the Western Hemisphere, but Latin American nations d
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not trade much among themselves; Argentina and . Uruguay are the only
countries in the area where foreign trade is Ooriented toward Western Europe;
Paraguay is the only country trading primarily with its im·m ediate neighbors;
commerce with the United States predominates in the foreign trade of all
other Latin American countries.
Because of this geographic pattern, Latin Amerioa does not feel itself a
part of the world market, subject to' that market's ehb and flow. I,t feels,
rather, an economic dependence on the Colossus to' the North, which arbitrarily
fixes the pr,ices and volume of its exports and imports. Such a picture is false,
because the Colossus itself depends on trends in the world economy. It is,
nevertheless, extremely difficult to' explain the true situation to local economists
and impossible to explain it to the man in the street.
Foreign Capital: The problem of capital is the maj or issue in discussions
of ways to accelerate economic progress in Latin America. I have tried to
show that the scarcity of capital is not the maj Oor obstacle to' prosperity in
Latin America; the main roadblocks are psychO'logical and political, one of
them being unproductive use and waste of availarb le funds. But whatever
the causes, the area needs a continuous inflow· of funds from abroad, and a
program of foreign economic: policy in Latin America must meet this need.
The economic development of Latin America in colonial times rested on
the combination of local slave lahor and Spanish capital (imported from the
mother country or amassed by plundering the conquered land) . Foreign
investments of the modern type appeared on the Latin American scene after
the wars for independence, in the 1820s. British investme.n ts in Argentina
were followed by loans to almost all Latin American republics, floated in
London and later in Paris. European capital was lured by the myth of the
fabulous wealth of the young overseas nations. Very soon, however, all Latin
American loans fell into default, and the flow of European capital to South
America and the Caribbean ceased for three deoades. It was resumed in
the 1860s and gained strength after steamers a.ppeared on trans-Atlantic lanes.
High profits from tin, copper and silver mines and sugar and coffee plantations "in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Peru and the Caribbean attr.acted investment capital. Considerable capital also went fOor railroad construction and
loans to local governments. Great Britain was the main creditor, followed by
France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Before the turn of the century, United States capital likewise appeared in Mexico, Cuba and, on a
smaller scale, in .other Latin American republics. *
By 1914, foreign investments in Latin America totaled $8.5 billion, with
Great Britain leading ($3.7 billion), the United States in second place ($1.7
billion), France third ($1.2 billion), and Germany fourth ($900 million).
This was the high tide of European investment in that part of the world. If
O'ne considers changes in the purchasing power Oof the dollar, it was also the
high mark of all foreign investments, including those of the United States, in
the expanse from the Rio Grande to the Straits of Magellan. In relation to this
area's aggregate national income or the value of its exports, foreign capital
.United Nations. Foreign Capital in Latin America (New York, 1955).
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World Bank Loans
to Latin America

..
.,
~

No.ol Amount
loans (in mill.)

Country

"
"

•t

..
#

~

~

CO MMUN I CA TI ONS

CRO P STO RAGE

"

ELEC T R I C POWER

FAR M M EC HANIZATION

HIG HWAY S

INDUSTR Y

I RRIGATION

~
~

-'

Brazil . . ......
Chile .. . .. . .. 7
Colombia ... .
Costa Rica ., . I
Ecuador ......... 5
EI Salvador .. 2
Guatemala . .. I
Haiti . . ... .... "
Honduras " " " I
Mexico . .... .... . 7
Nicaragua . , . 10
Panama ........ . 3
Paraguay " "" "
Peru . .. . . " ..... 8
Uruguay ... . . 3

POR TS

a

WATERWA YS

R AIL ROADS

WATE R EXPLORA TION

"

$182.4
73.6
111.2
3.0
32.6
23.6
18.2
2.6
4.2
152.3
22.9
6.8
4.4
40.9
64.0

Total
15 countries 72 loans $744.7

in Latin America today represents Dnly a fraction of what it was on the eve
of World War I.
The inflow of capital frDm Europe was interrupted by World War I and
resumed on a oonsiderably reduced scale in the interwar years, while previous
investments depreciated 'a nd were pa'rtially withdrawn. The movement 'Of
capital across the Atlantic was stopped again in the 1930s hy the great depression, which was followed hy World War II, bringing fuITher depreciation and withdrawal Df British, French, German ·a nd other foreign holdings.
Before the outbreak of World War II, foreign investments in Latin America
were estimated at $9 hillion, including $3.5 hill ion held by the United States,
$4.0 Ibillion held by the United Kingdom, and $1.5 .billion provided by Dther
European countries. In terms of dollars with the purchasing power of 1914,
the total Df foreign investments was equivalent to' $6.3 billion-those of the
United States, $2.8 billion, and those Df Europe, $3.5 billion. Thus, the
withdrawal oJ European capital from Latin America was only partly offset by
the inflow of investments from the United States (or the purchase of European
interests by United States concerns).
During World War II and in the postwar years, United States capital
gained a new positiDn in Latin America, mainly in the fo·r m of direct productive investment, ,b ut again its advance could not offset the retreat of European
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apital. * This general trend has continued. The holdings of the United Stat s
in Latin America grew steadily, from $3 billion in 1946 to $7 billion in 1956
When the change in the purchasing power of the dollar is taken into account,
the latter amount is equivalent to $4.8 billion at 1946 prices. This represents
a gain of 60 per cent in a decade, or an average growth rate of less than 4
per cent a year-a far cry fr0'm the spectacular expansion P0'rtrayed by the
U. S. Department of Commerce in its 1957 report on U. S. investment in
Latin Amer,ica. There has also been a steady but not very brisk inflow
f capital fr0'm Eur ope.
The total am(Hl,nt of all foreign investments in Latin America in 1956 has
been estimated by our ICA -a t $9.5 billion-equivalent t0' $5.7 billion at
1944-45 prices and hardly more than $3 hillion at 1914 prices.
The Role of U.S. Private Capital: Until 1929, U. S. capital favored sugar
plantations in Cuba and oil wells in Mexic0'. More recently , Venezuela and
Brazil have advanced to first place. The b00'k value O'f U. S. investments in
Latin American countries in 1956 was as follows (in millions of dollars ) :
Tofal .. .... . ...... . . ... .... ..
Venezuela .................. ..
Brazil .. ................ . . . ...
Cuba . .. .. ... ... .............
Chile . .............. .. .......
Mexico .. . , . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ...

7,008
1,817
1,209
774
677
675

Central America·, Dominican
Republic, Haiti .... .... ... . . .
Argentina .... ...... . . . . ..... .
Peru . . ... . .. . . .. . ..... . . . . .. .
Colombia .... . . . .. . . . ....... .
Others ......... . .. . . . .. . .. .. .

610
470
354
289
133

* Investment. in Panama exclude tanker and shipping operations ($460 million in 1956).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. US. Inves'men', in 'he Latin American Economy. 1957.
Petroleum is the main field f0'r U. S. capital ($2.0 billion in 1956) ; manufactures come next ($1.5 billion), followed by mining ($1.1 billion), plantations ($632 million) and trade ($495 million).
The sales of U. S. corporations in Latin America grossed $4.9 billiori in
1955. Products worth $2.1 billion were exported, mainly to t4e United States,
and $2.8 billion was received on the domestic markets. The U. S. Department
of Commerce emphasizes that American capital accounted for 30 per cent of
the exports of Latin American nations in 1955. It 'is an open question, however, whether this speaks well for our investments in the area. Production
for ex:port is a typical operation of foreign capital in colonies _ap9 has never
been popular with the indigenous populations.
.
U. S. corporations in Latin America had . 625,000 employes in 1955 and,
as a rule, offered them better working conditions and higher wages, than
native employers. Remitted corporate profits in that year amounted to
$680 milHo,n ; the net return on equity capital was no less than 14' per ·cent.
In addition, the b0'0'k value of the enterpri~es increased ·b y one billion pollars
in 1955, although only $148 million ~f new United States money went i~to
produotion. The large part of increased value, therefore, represented capital
gains of United States stockholders, bringing their t0'tal gains up to 30 per
• What happened in Latin America after the outbreak pC ' World War II conCormed with a much
broad er, worldwide trend. The value of foreign investments in the world as a whole was estimated at
$42 billion in 1944-45. aI compared with $44 billion in 1914. M~reover. the $42 billion in 1944-45 was roughly
equivalent to S25 bUlion at 1914 prieee. 10 relation to world income, the value of Coreigo investment. in
1941.45 wa s less than a thir d, and probably not much m ore than a fourth . of that in 1914.
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cent or more of equity capital. Latin American econO'mists are fairly well
informed on the affairs of foreign concerns in their cOountries, but the public
at large knows little about this subject and believes that the rate O'f prO'fits of
the U. S. corporations is even higher.
Foreign capital, especially U. S. capital, is ubiquitous in Latin America, hut
its contributiOon to the economic growth of the area is somewhat reduced by
fluctuatiOons in its flow, which are determined by the opportunities offered
for investment elsewhere and largely by the far-fledged, often glO'bal, plans
O'f leading corporations. The decisions of the latter, although wholly logical
from the point of view of ,t heir stockholders, may appear erratic from the
point of view of host countries. The U. S. Department of COommerce estImates
the flow of net direct investments of U. S. corporations into Latin A,m erica as
follOoWS (in milliO'ns of dollars) :
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951

..

..

71
457
332
332
40
166

227
117
88
193
612

1952
1953
1954
19~5

1956

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Balance 0/ Payment•• S,ati,tical Supplem ent.

Wa8h~ton

1958.

The average inflow of about $200 million a year in 1950-56 is a fairly
meaningless figure when the amounts for single years vary from $40 million
to $612 million. Moreover, 'a n investment Oof half a billion dollars in the oil
fields of Venezuela can hardly be considered by people in Brazil, Mexico or
Chile as an investment in the expanding economy of the continent.
The attitude of people in Latin America too the predominance of U. S.
capital in certain economic sectors (mining, steel, plantatiO'ns) is neither
hostile nOor enthusiastic . .We heard no complaints that U. S. firms underpay
their workers, violate labor regulations, evade taxes or compete unfairly with
local capital. But likewise we did not hear any local economist, businessman,
journalist or government official refer to U. S: capital in the country in the
eulO'gistic terms used by our Department of Commerce. All in all, people
seem to realize that the inflow of foreign capital i~.in the interest of their
cOountry. We Oobserved this attitude in Brazil and Mexico, Chile and ColOombia,
and to' some extent in other countries we visited, in .prOoyincial cities as we~l
as in capitals.
SOometimes people seemed proud that American, British, French~ GenTIan,
Japanese and Dutch corporations were building fa<;tories around their city,
hut Dn the whole they were nDt happy a,bO'ut the way in which foreign capital
is used in their countries. Resentment is w~despr.ead against the extliaction
of Dil ·a nd Dres by foreign enterprises. PeO'ple think that such operations are
depriving Latin American nations of their resources. In Argentina, Brazil
and MexicO' this idea has found its expression in almost hysterioal oppositiO'n
to' exploitation of petroleum by fO'reign capital. The slqg~ , "Th~ , Oil. Is
Ours" has become a part of the credO' O'f ecO'npmic nationalislIl:. :Likewise
there is resentment, though less' passionate, against exporting local raw mate·

rials such as nres, instead of processing them at the mouth of the mines. We
heard m1a ny complaints that foreign capital is guided not by the interest of
the host countries but by the search fo.r profit&--which is, of course, equally
true of dnmestic capital. Similarly, people complain about the tremendous
p~ofits foreign capital receives, without noticing that domestiC' capital is
even more rapacious, demanding annual interest of not less than 30 per cent,
and ,i n some cases as much as 90 per cent.
All in all, people would prefer foreign po·rtfQtlio investments in local private
and puhlic enterprises tn the direct investments which have become the prevailing operation of private foreign capital in Latin A.m erica.
The Eximbank and the u.s. Government: Along with the inflo.w of private
foreign capital, Latin America obtains some funds for its economic development from the World Bank and Export-Import Bank of Washington (Eximbank). The purposes and statutes of these two organizations differ but they
often act cnncurrently, and m-a ny projects have been financed hy bnth organizations. Indeed, when a foreign government uses a loan from the World Bank
fnr purchasing machinery or industrial equipment in the United States, this
loan operates like an Eximbank credit. Inversely, when an Eximhank loan
permits the government or its contractors tn buy railroad equipment, road
building machinery, trucks or electrical-installation materials in the United
States, the .operation differs little from financial support of the respective
projects by the World Bank.
Both institutions charge the sa,m e interest f0'r their lo-ans, usually 4.5 to 5.5
per cent, and reserve the right of control over the use of funds lent by thenl.
But the Eximbank opens short-term as well as long-term credits and occasionally lends rather small amounts 0'f money, while the World Bank concentrates
on long-term loans for larger projects.
The Eximbank began operations in February 1934 and authorized credits
totaling almost $9 billion up to the end of 1957. Of this amount, $3.2 billion
was designed for financing expo.rts to Latin America, but credit'S f0'r $669
minion were cancelled, so that $2.5 billion remained available. Only $1.8
billion was actually disbursed, and ·a lmost half of this amount has been repaid. Currently, the Eximhank authorizes new credits to Latin America at
a rate of roughly $200 million a year, but a part of -authorized credits is usually
cancelled, and new credits .are partly offset :b y repayment of old debts. Thus,
the net new credits of the Eximbank to the Latin American ooonomy hardly
exceed $100 million a year.
Direct grants and loans by the United States Government are another
source of capital inflow to the area. Apart from military aid, which adds
little to the economy of the receiving nation, the U. S. Government awarded
the Latin American republics $225 million in loans and $165 million in grants
in the three years 1954-56. From the point of view of Latin America, these
loans and gran'ts are more productive tthan the inflow of private capital not
QllIly because they are direoted to' proper targets but 'a lso because the country
does not pay the high price demalllded by private capital.
'. The World Bank: Most satisf.actory to' the Latin American countries, however, are the loans accorded by the World Bank. They are usually directed
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toward the most urgent projects, are given on terms as favorahle as those of
the Eximbank, and in1p1y no politic-al obligation on the part of the receiving
oountry to the creditor· nation. Up to the end of 1957, the World Bank had
awarded 72 loans to· 15 Latin American countries for a total amount of $74.5
million, distributed as follows (in millions of dollars) :
Brazil ..............
Mexico............
Colombia ..... .. ...
Chile .... . . . . . . . . . .

182
152
III
74

Uruguay. . . . . . . . . . .
Peru ........ . .. , ..
Ecuador. . . . . . . . . . .
EI Salvador ... . ....

64
41
33
24

Nicaragua. . . . . . . . .
Guatemala. .. ..... .
Panama. . . . . . . . . . . .
Others. .. .........

23
18
7
16

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Loans at Work, March 1958.

All these are development loans. Almost half the total a-m ount was
designated for generation ,a nd distribution of electric power, some 40 per
cent for building and rehabilitating railroads and highways, the rest for
agrioulture (farm mechanization, irrigation and flood oontrol, and so on),
industry (pulp) and communications (telegr-a ph and telephone). Of $50
million lent by the World Bank to Latin America in 1957, more than 80 per
cent went for the development of power ($15 million to Chile, $1.6 million to
Nicaragua, $25.5 million to Uruguay).
Current Supply of Foreign Capital: In all, in 1954-56 Latin America
obtained almost $2 billion in loans, credits and grants from abroad: some
$900 million in direct private investments from the United States, approximately $200-250 million from other countries, a.bout $400 million in loans
and .grants from the United States Government, $300 million from the Eximbank and $150 million from the World Bank. The total is higher than in the
preceding three years because of unusually large private investments in 1956.
The normal flow of foreign capital is probably close to $600 million a year,
with one third supplied by private capital and two-thirds provided by the
World Bank and United States Government, either directly or through the
Eximbank..*
Taking into account the current national income of the area-approximately
$40 billion-and growth of population at a rate of 2.5 per cent a year, L'a tin
America needs net investments at an annual rate o,f $3 to $4 billion for
adequate development of its economy (including the building of houses but
excluding the maintenance cost of existing capital). The flow from abroad
described above meets S0me 15 to 20 per cent of this need. Economic
progress in the area could proba,b ly be accelerated if, along with changes
in the psychological climate, economic practices and other conditions, the
inflow of capital were to increase. It is ohvious, however, that from the
point of view of the economies .of the Latin American countries, an expansion. of loans from the World Bank would mean more than a much larger
increment in foreign private investments.
The preceding discussion has not dealt with the operations of the new
U. S. Development Loan Fund and the Special Fund for Latin America, both
established in 1957. The Development Loan Fund ($300 million for the
first year) is in an early phase of operation and has not attracted much
• Since the U~ted States contributes more than one-third of the capital of the World Bank, its share in
public 'funds ' flowing into the Latin American economy frOID abroad is dOle to 90 per cent.
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attention in Latin America. Of the original applicatiOons for loans totaling
$4 billion, only 3 per cent (44 million) was requested by Latin American
governments. The comments on the objectives and philosophy of the Fund,
as presented in the Report to Congress on Mutual Security, leave an impression that the program is more cOoncerned with the cold war and promotion
of principles of free enterPrise than with the economic development of the
respective countries:
The Special Fund, of $15 million appropriated in the fiscal year 1957 was
used essenti,aHy for small loans to small oountries: $3 million to Honduras, $2
million tOo Panama, $2 million to Costa Rica, $2 million to Ecuador, $2 milliOon
to Peru, $1 million to Par,a guay, and the rest tOo the Organi~a.tion of the
American States. The amounts allocated and the pattern of distributiOon suggest that the purpose was to give sOomething tOo as large as possible a numlb er of
aEplicant states, 'without serious thought of helping Latin America in developing its resources.
U. S. Technical Assistance: The effOorts of Latin American countries to accelef1ate economic progress and improve the living oonditiOons of the people
are support~d by numerous technical ass~st~nce programs of the United N atiOons, ' the United States and private org·anizations. The oldest and most impOortant among them is the program inaugurated in the 1930s 'b y the Institute for
Inter-American Affairs (IIAA). The ideas of this pro~ram were later applied
on a much broader scale in the Point Four progf1am. Suhsequently the latter
changed its name in . line with the vicissitudes of U. S. politics-it was called
Toohnioal COooperation Administration (TCA) in. 1950-53, then became a
part of Foreign Operations (FOA) and was integrated with International
C<?operati~n (leA) in 1955. The administrative ohanges, however, have not
seriOously affected the operations of the program.in Latin Amerioa where even
now it 'is known under its original names, IIAA or Point FOour. Detailed discussion of it is not within the scope of this study. The following paragraphs
mention only the salient features. *
, The prpgram mainly covers the four fields of health, education, agriculture
?nd industry, but attentiQn is al~o given to transportation, the productivity
prohle~ (la;bOor) " organization" of modern public administration, and so on.
Eaoh project is carned out on the hasis ' of co()pe:r:ation between the United
States mission and the. hos~ government and must be initiated by the latter.
In each project the Uo. S.- agency supplies specially trained technicians and
funds oo;v ering their salaries an~ purohase of necessary equip~ent. The host
government defrays all other expenses that demand looal curren.cy, including
salarles of looal personnel. In time, native workers who have received on-thejob tr'aining replace' the United Staets technicians, and the share of, the United
States in financing the pr,oj eel declines while that of the host government
i
increases until the U. _.S. mission withdraws completely and the project is
.
continued by local personnel alone.
B~se of the transfer of funds and considerable discrepancies between
- --

i~

._

• An excellent analyai. ,o f t~a and other technical allistance program. in Latin America will be found
in the report pubii.hed
t~ National, Plannin, A.88ociatioD UDder the title "Technical Cooperation in
Latin America. Reeommendali~n. r';r the 'Fulure." '
..
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VII. U. S. Technical Assistance and Economic Aid
(In thousands 0/ dollars)
TECHNICAL COOPERATION
Cumulative
through
Country

1956
-

Mexico , , , , ' , , , , , . ,
Guatemala ........
EI Salvad·or ",' , ",
Nicaragua . . . . .. .. .
Honduras ... . ... . .
Costa Rica . .. .. . . .
Panama .. .. . . .....
Cuba ........... . .
Dominican Republic
Haiti ..... , .. , , " , ,
Venezuela . . . . ... ..
Colombia , ." ,,'" ,
Ecuador " " ' , ', '"
Peru .... .. .. .. .. ..
Bolivia . . .. .. . .....
Paraguay "" , " ' "
Chile .. .. . . .......
Argentina .. . . . . ...
Uruguay ... . .. ....
Brazil ..... . .......

1957

1958

1958

888
2,238
',069
68'
1,324
904
1,023
569
156

680
2,400
',000
900
',350
1,050
1,'70
570
190
',300
'70
',290
',880
2,850
3,100
1,480
2,500
350
200
4,700

5,841
8,974
5,400
4,820
7,266
6,483
7,710
2,564
1,634
5,795
999
7,872
10,215
16,419
17,000
10,656
12,656
350
1,650
23,134

--

705
1,983
934
756
','56
907
1,096
471
265
1,361
150
1,323
1,660
2,819
2,500
1,801
2,174

',"6
J35
','56
1,809
2,594
3,300
1,530
2,456

154
3,604

254
4,512

TOTAL . ......... 25,819 27,714 29,130 157,438

OTHER ECONOMIC AID
Cumulative
through
1956

1957

1958

1958

16,'93

'5,280

'0,000

46,281

5,000

',010

22J 900

20,000

7,658

17,000

74,100

84

84

44,177

36,290 27,000 128,123

Source: Computed from the Report of the ICA for the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, 85th Congress. Mutual Security Act of 1958, Part XIV.

appropriations and actual use of funds, it is difficult to obtain a perf~tly clear
pioture of the program and its distribution among individuai countries and
fields of activities. According to the survey presented by the Administration
to the House Foreign Affairs Co~mittee, the United States has spent a t,o bl
of $157 million on technical assistance in ' Latin America, from the' start of
the respective programs through the fisoal year 1958. Expenditures have ~
creased gradually in recent years: ,$25.8 million in fi,soal year 1956, $27.7
million in 1957, $29.1 million in 1958 (estimated ) . Brazil has the largest
pr~gram, followed by Bo~ivia, Peru, Paraguay and ·Guatemala.
Economic aid~partly as defense support, partly as ~mergency grant~
was extended to Bolivia, Guat~ala and Haiti, in response to the critical
.
situation in these countries as a result of political uphea~als:
All in all $285 million had been spent in iatin American countries fo~ technical assistance and. economic aid in the past seven years- less than the cost
01 a modern battleship or ~ircraft carrier.
'
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VII'. U. S. Technical Assistance by Main Activities
Fiscal Y ear 1958 ( Estimate, in thousU!nds 0/ dollars)

Country

Total

Mexico . .. .... .... . . . . .... . ....
680
Guatemala** .... ........ ...... 12,400
EI Salvador .... . . . . ........ . 1,000
Nicaragua .... . . . ...... . .... .
900
Honduras . ... .. . . ... . . 1,350
Costa Rica .... . . . .... .. ...... 1,050
Panama .......... .... .... . ........ 1,170
Cuba .......... .... ........ .... .... .
570
Dominican Republic ..
190
Haiti·· ..... . .. . .. . . .. 3,300
Venezuela . . ............ . .... .
170
Colombia . .. . . . . . ... . . 1,290
Ecuador .... . . .... .... ...... ...... 1,880
Peru ........ . .......... . ............ 2,850
Bolivia ........ . .... .... .. . .... . . 4,200
Paraguay .. .... . .. . ...... . .... . 1,480
Chile . .. .... .... .... . .... .... ...... 2,500
Argentina ...... . ................
350
Uruguay . . . .. . .. .... . .
200
Brazil*· .. . .. . .. . . .. ... 4,700

TOTAL

......... . .. 42,230

Inaus- TransHealth,
porsanita- Eauca- Agricul- try,
ture mining tation Labor Other*
tion
tion

64
996
206
94
212
218
175

790
170
381
446
538
526
231
308

15
780
119
270
408
100
299
94
183
310

5,042
374
388
442
416
478
245
1,300

16
373
80 5,020
70
28
50
18
110
95
36
78
23
92
27
7
720
25

110
20
84
10
50
22
II

26

102
462
147
60
110
163
106
86
155

105
795

816

1,363

326

315

169

153
266
706
494
346
332
46
95
916

6,255

5,185

15,300

2,115

7,958

672

4,745

565
725
1,054
1,552
356
1,000

III

327
406
525
352
70

80
116
146
87

76

580
66

940
195
280
74

94

* Includes public 2dmini stration, gen eral and miscellaneo us.
** Includes part of ap propr iation for econ om ic aid .

The funds were distrihuted among broad fields of activity and single
projects ,a ccording to the <desires of host governments. Unavoidably, they have
been spread rrather thin in relation to the vast scope of the program.
The success of the program has been most striking in the field of health
and sanitation. Hospitals have been built, health centers organized, facilities
for enviro,n mental sanitatirOn introduced, campaigns waged against malaria
and contagious diseases. Great attention has been given to the training of local
personnel on all levels. Latin Amerioa is studded with medical institutions
that have grown out of "servicios" founded ·b y the IIAA. The wo~k, however,
is far from completion. Even in such prosperous nations as B~azil and Mexico,
there remain vast ·a reas with pathetically inadequate health conditions, while
sanitation and health services in less developed countries are often limited
to cities 'a nd very little progress has heen made in rural areas.
We had occasion to observe the medical and sanit ation wo'r k of the United
States missions, with American and looal personnel, in various Latin American
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countries, especially along the Pacific coast, and talked about this work with
local intellectuals. We heard very little adverse oriticism of the program and
many laudatory com,ments, but our impression is that the job has just begun
and the work of the U. S. missions in this field should be glfea.tly expanded,
particularly in ·the villages.
The educational work of the U. S. missions is conoentrated on vocational
and technical training in special schO'ols and centers 'a nd in classes added to
regular schools. The United States has also helped in organizing "normal
schools" for training teachers.
In Peru and Bolivia, we visited "nuclear schools" developed in rural areas
with the aid of our missions. Elementary rural sooO'ols are grouped in clusters,
"nuclei," attached to a central sohool. The latter provides four grades of
elementary education, and supervision and leadership to the attached schools,
which have classes for one or two grades. Of course, this arrangement is a far

AN UNFINISHED RURAL SCHOOL BUILT BY PEASANTS IN BOLIVIA

cry from a sound system of elementary education with from four to six grades
in each school, but it represents a step forward in areas where not more than
20 per cent of the boys and girls enrolled in the first class have a chance to
complete the second year, and not more than 5 or 10 per cent go as far as
the fourth grade.
In some cases, the U. S. missions have saved local school systems from
serious difficulties. In one oountry, for example, all rural schools were on
the verge of being closed for lack of funds to pay the teaohen;' salaries. A
grant of $2 million arranged by the mission prevented the collapse of the
rural school system.
Our missions have also provided another form of assistance to elementary
education by helping farmers in remote villages to build schools without
financial support from the Ministry of Education. After the walls of the building have been raised, the local autholr ities usually agree to provide tiles for
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the roof, and with the school's building completed, the Ministry of Eduoation
is willing to provide a teacher.
Such forms of assistance in the field of primary education testify to a very
low level of eduoation in respective areas. But this is precisely the merit of
this system-it brings aid to people where such a-id is most urgently needed.
We ,also saw traces of 'work of the U. S. missions in schools on all levels:
equipment for teaching physics, for toohnical training in high schools and
colleges, labor.atories, electrical and optical instruments, movie PTojectors, etc.
Technical !assistance in the field of industry inoludes specialized training,
distribution of simple maohinery and introductiQn of certain branches of
production such 'as brick, cement, glass, fertilizers and canning. This program
does not undertake the more ambitious industrial proj oots, such as building of
power stations ,a nd 'steel mills.
Most diversified is the aotivity of our techuioal assistance in the field of
agriculture. It ranges from efforts to improve living conditions in villages,
,distribute fertilizer, improve seed and cattle breeds, to far-reaching prQjects
of resettlement as in Guatemala, and regional development, as ,i n ChilIan,
Chile. Pemaps, the greatest ,achievement 'Of our agricultural experts has been
in gaining the oooperation of local agricu1tural colleges in training students
for extension work in the villages. In Ecnado,r , they took an aotive part in
establishing a sohool for tropical agriculture for the sons of looal farmers.
Moreover, the work of the missions in villages lost in the Andes or tropical
jungles starts at a level of misery at which technical assistance c·annot be
separated -trom sanitary or welfare Wlork or hasic education. We visited villages where agricultural extensiojIl agents ·a re engaged in campaigns to' introduce elementary stoves for cooking or bedsteads in farm houses, or to teach
farmers to out an opening in the wall to let light into the roo·m. Such a hole
in the wall, the first step for introducing windows with glass panes, may mark
the beginning of a cultural revolution in a village. We saw such "improved"
houses but had no opportunity :to observe the impact of the innovation on the
villagers. The head of one U. S. mission told us of his visit to a village where
the first opening was made in an adobe hut. A erowd of women in front of
the building were almost overwhelmed by emotion : Was this not a miracle?
Sunlight in the house!
We ourselves saw a farmhouse in which a hedstead four inches high had
Ibeen installed for the first time. There was no other furniture-no chairs, no
benches, no tables. People sat and had slept on the dirt floor, bitterly oold
at night in that Andean village.
We-toured villages in the company of local agronomists tr,ained by Point
Four technicians, all young, full of ener'gy and enthusias'm. We saw them at
work with our people. This was one of the brightest, most encouraging impressions we had during our trip.
UN and OAS Technical Assistance: Along with the Point Four missions,
otlier organizations are ·a t work in similar fields in Latin America. The United
Nations is represented mainly by UNESCO, WHO and FAO. Their contribution is noteworthy although their work is stretched too thinly and the means
at their disposal are utterly inadequate-some $4 million to be divided among
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haH a dozen agencies in fifteen or more countries! It seems that lack of funds
has compelled the UN agencies to concentrate on shorl-run prQject~ Their
missions come and go. We saw many reports prepared by such missions,
usually full of excellent advice to the local governments on what they should
or should not do. Perhaps such recommendations were followed through or
at least had some impact on the thinking of local governments, but I heard
nothing to this effect.
Comparing my impressions of the toohnical assistance w(}rk of our missions
with that of the United Nations, I think that, apart from a different scale of
activities, our missions have two advantages: Their work is done in close cooperation with local people; they have a m'o re permanent character. "
Among the ventures in technical assistance hy the Organi~artion of American States, mention should he made of the Inter-American Housing Center
(CINVA). Its emphasis is on the development of plans and toohniques . for
building low-cost houses, often on the basis of self-aid, for -families .and
communities now living in conditions of humiHating poverty. The work of
the Center is closely associated with that of Technical Assistance mission.
Often the technical ideas of the Center are brought to the people and transformed into reality by the workers of lCA. These ideas are very"simple: use
of local building materials; economical use of cement blocks; role of social
workers in housing projects; organization of "cooperatives" for , building
houses with one's own hands. At the time we visited the ClNVA headquarters

'CINYA·RAM,' THE SOIL·CEMENT BLOCK MAKI.NG HAND "RESS
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in Bogota, Colombia, its attention was focused on a new soil-cement block
making -machine. This is a very primitive, clumsy-looking hand press that
produces solid blocks out of almost any soil. It can be operated by two men,
and if necessary by one m,an. It can be dismantled and transported on mulehack to inaccessible areas. It had been planned as la "do-it-yourself" device
and can be made very oheap in mass production. Prospects are good that
in a ,s hort time, thO'usands and 'p erhaps a hundred thQusand suoh "sinve-Ram"
presses will be put into actiQn, and millions of peQple thus enabled to' build
better, weather-resistant dwellings fO'r themselves. When the CINVA workers
e~plained to us the advantages of theiT machine, we shared their enthusiasm
and felt that their press was a greater aohievement than SQme glamO'rous hQusing projects. Indeed, the Center, working Qn a very mQdest budget, ooneentrates its .attentio,n ton improving the housing conditions of the maj ority of
the populatiQn in Latin Amerioa, while mQst Qf the tambitiQus hQusing proj ects
merely supply greater oQmfort to' thQse whO' can pay.
EducatiQn and health prQblems have alsO' attracted variQus religious groups
to Latin Amerioa. The National Planning AssociatiQn has estimated that mQre
than 60 United States religious groups--Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and
interdenQminational-are conducting prQgrams of health, education and agriculture in every cQuntry Qf Latin America, doing the equivalent Qf the fulltime wQrk of 2,000 technicians. They maintain over 100 hQspitals and nursing
schools, sponSQr more than 1,000 primary schoQls, about ISO secondary
schoQls, about 60 commercial and vocational schO'ols; they conduct Qver 40
prQjects of agricultural extension education. Substantial oontributiQn in the
field O'f health services is also being made by the Rockefeller and KellQgg
F QundatiQns.
Summary: Certain conclusions may be drawn frQm this outline Qf the
PQsition Qf Latin America in world trade, its receipt of foreign capital and
econQmic aid, and the toohnical assistance it Qbtains from the United States
and international organizations.
Latin America has nQt boon left without eoonO'mic and toohnical aid, and
has not, I believe, been abused or mistreated by the United States in foreign
tr'a,de. NQr has it been overlooked O'r slighted in th economic and technical assistance programs of the United States and United NatiQns. There are certain
defects, however, in our trade policy, in the flow Qf foreign investments and
in the eoonO'mic and technioal assistance accQrded to' this area:
• ruhe trade policy of the United States is determ~ned withO'ut regard to'
its impact on the economy of Latin Amerioan nations.
• The flow of private capital from the U. S. and Qther cQuntries to Latin
America is utterly erratic from the ~poiIlit of view of IQcal peQple and tis Qften
directed to' objectives that have nO'thing to' dO' with the ,needs of local economy.
• The supply of public funds (WQrld Bank, Eximbank and U. S. Government) fluctuates from year to' year and lacks the -continuity necessary for
long-run planning.
• The program Qf technical assistance has been conspicuously successful
in some CQuntries but dQes nQt penetrate intO' Qther regions where it would
be equally effective.
42

s. U. S. Policy In Latin America
G

Latin America is as remDte from the critical theaters
glDbal strategy Df the Pentagon and the Kremlin as it is possible to be
on Dur tiny planet in the atom age. This makes the objectives of United States
policy in Latin America radically different frDm thDse in EurOope, Africa or
Asia-an immense arena in which the West meets and clashes with the East.
Whatever the final judgment of history abDut the nature of this clash, it appears to. us as the defense Oof freedom and civilizlatiDn -against hDstile forces.
In view Df the Dverwhelming impOortance of this is'sue, the United States has
felt cDmpelled tOo subDrdinate its foreign policy tOo global strategic requirements. The hDtter the cold wa.r becDmes, the more exacting becomes the
military aspect of its fDreign pDlicy and the deeper the difference between
the .objectives Df this policy in the Old WO'rld and Latin America. The main
source Df vacillatiDn and apparent contradictiDns in our policy tDward the
South is the fact that this policy is considered a part O'f Dur global strategy,
which it is not.
What is frequently represented as a change in the United States attitude
toward Latin American nations has been the result of the reGrientation Df
Dur general fO'reign pDlicy. Recall the Dutline of programs "fDr peace and
freedom" in President Truman's inaugural address in January 1949:
"First, we will cDntinue to give unfaltering sUppDrt to the United Nations
and rella ted agencies and we will continue to' search for ways tOo strengthen
their authOority and increase their effectiveness....
"Seoond, we will continue our prO'grams for world economic recovery ....
"Third, we will strengthen freedom-IDving nations against the dangers of
aggression. . . .
"Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits
Qif our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the imprGvement and growth of underdevelGped areas...."
The President further elaborated as follDws:
"We shO'uld make available tOo peace-loving peoples the benefits of 'Our
store of technical knowledge in Grder to help them to realize their aspirations
for a better life. And, in cODperation with Dther natiDns, we should fDster
capital investment in areas needing development.
"Our ·a im should be to' help the ·f ree peDple O'f the world, thrOough their 'Own
effGrts, tOo prGduce mOore food, more clDthing, more materi,a ls for hOousing
and mOore mechanical power to' lighten their burdens....
"It must be a world-wide effOort for achievement Oof peace, plenty and freedom."
The global' military policy (military aid to foreign cOountries) appears
here as one of the four cOornerstOones Df foreign pO'licy, the Gther three being
nOon-military: support of the United NatiOons, foreign economic aid and internatiDnal technical assistance prDgram (PO'int Four). The particular objective
Df United States pGlicy in Latin America cO'uld be clearly Ooutlined against
the backgrOound Df points tWD and fDur O'f this progra.m..
WO'rld affadrs, however, have taken another turn. After the Korean War,
EOGRAPHICALLY,

Df
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foreign economic aid and technical assistance were submerged under the
concern abo.ut national security through military alliances and the armaments
race. Seven years after Truman's inaugural address, the new President of
the United States presented another philosophy o.f foreign policy in his
Message to the Co.ngress on the Mutual Security Pro.gram:
"The need fo.r a mutual security program is urgent because there are still
nations eager to strive with us fo.r peace and freedom but, without our help,
lack the means o.f doing so.
"The need is urgent because there are still forces hostile to freedQm that
QQmpel the free Wo.rld to. maintain adequate and coordinated military power
to. deter aggression.
"The need is urgent because there are still peoples who aspire to sustain
their freedom but confront economic obstacles that are beyond their capabili.
ties o.f surmounting alone."
In view of these circumstances, the people of the United States were asked
to make sacrifices ,fo.r military, technical and economic 'assistance to. Qther
nations, with a strong emphasis on the military ,aspect of the mutual seourity
pro.gram:
"The So.viet maneuver . . . includes offer of bilateral trade arrangements
,which ma.y involve provisions of arms and capital goods as well as technical
assistance. . . .
"Even when we welco.me respite from the Soviet policy of threat and
violence we must take careful stock of what still remains of it. . . . There is
nothing •.. to warrant a slackening of our efforts to strengthen the oommon
defense of the free world.
"In its new departures in foreign policy, we see that the Soviet Union
continues in its familiar pattern of ceaseless prQbing for oPPQrtunities to
~ploit politioal and eco.no.mic weaknesses.
" . . . With Soviet leaders openly proclaiming their world aim, it would
be folly for us and QUI' friends to relax our collective efforts toward stability
and security."
The meaning of the principles established here as guidelines of U.S. foreign
policy is not concealed by the reservation: "Needless to say, we do. not intend
to' permit specific Soviet moves to contro.l our activities." Indeed, the whole
p:vogram of mutual security is presented as a vigilant defense, and such a
defense is unavoidably co.ntrolled by the moves of the ruthless and shrewd
enemy.
President Eisenho.wer's message co.ntained a special paragraph concerning
Latin America : "We propose to. strengthen further the friendly relationships
which exist with our sister republics in the South. I recommend that we continue to. encourage by technical assistance the programs initiated by the Latin
American nations to make better use of their own resources."
The relation of this proposal to the program of mutual ~ecurity is not
very clear. The "Summary Presentation" of th · progr m published jointly
by the Department of State, Department of Defense and International Cooperation Administration fills this gap by explaining the importance of Latin
meriea. to the United State~:

"Latin American influence in the United Nations and in their international
dealings, in support of peace, freedom and international justice, is a powerful
force for world stability and peace. From the military point of view, the
friendship and C(}()perati{)n of the nations of Latin America is essential to
the defense of the whole hemisphere."
Both arguments interpret the U.S. policy in Latin America as a part of
global cold war. Actually, however, Latin America has no part in this clash
of great powers. Thus, the U.S. policy in this part of the world is left hanging
in midair, without an adequate ideological foundation.
False Accusations The fact that the objectives of the United States in
Latin America have not been firmly established, has deprived its policy in
this area of internal consistency and made it an easy target for false accusa·
tions. The Communists decry it as a policy of colonial expansion designed
to grab the natural resources of the region. Others denounce the U,n ited States
for supporting reactionary forces in Latin American countries and arming
local dictators.
In my opinion, both accusations are false. It is ridiculous to speak of
Yankee i.mperialism and oolonialism in Latin America in view of the example
of Puerto Rico, which is, economically and politicaUy, one of the brightest
spots in the ~ea. Equally absurd is the insinuation that U.S. economic aid
to Bolivia and Guatemala o·r technical assistance to those countries plus
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile tends to subjugate these countries to
monop01istic U. S. capital. Our survey of technioal assistance in Latin America
shows clearly enough that this assistance contributes to the well-being of
the peoples concerned and strengthens their independence. The accusation
of colonial conspiracy ,b y Point Four personnel is a lie as shameless as the
acousation that milk distributed by the United States to school children in
poverty-stricken villages in the Andes· is poisonous.
The ,accusation that the United States is allying itself with reactionary forces
is more serious. As a gener,al rule, our Emhassies are inclined to c:ultivate
friendly relations with circles close to the government and the ruling party
Partly because of the violence of the inter-party feud in some Latin Ameriean
countries, they avoid association with the opposition. It cannot be denied
also that they have manifested sympathy with some local dictators for their
anti-Communist poliey and generosity toward American big businessmen.
There is no evidence, however, that the United States has maintained
dictators in power against the wishes of the people. Surely, the United
States was not to blame for Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Perez Jimenez in
Venezuela, Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominic-an Republic, Peron
in Argentina, or Batista in Cuba. Its conciliatory role in the Guatemalan revolution that ended the Arhenz regime cannot be described a~ a conspiracy
against democracy in that country.
True, the United States has given arms to some Latin American countrie~
which asked for military aid. The wisdom of this policy can be questioned.
I t can be argued that the armies of Latin American republics, equipped with
U.S. weapons, would be unable to defend themselves in the event of an attack
b the Soviet , and that the respective governments are more- likely t u
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their tanks and airplanes in clashes with sister republics and in internal
struggles for power. It can be argued that the policy of maintaining armies
in Latin American republics is fundamentally wrong and they might be
advised to disarm under a mutual security pact enforced by the Organization
of American States. This is, however, "a controversial issue. As long as Latin
American countries feel that as independent nations they must maintain
armed forces, the Uni,t ed States cannot ,d eny them weapons. Its military aid
to Latin American countries, whether under democratic or dictatorial regime,
has not gone beyond this general principle.
I therefore do not believe that the United States is responsible for the
existence of dictatorships in. Latin America, but it can be accused of lack of
clarity and consistency in its attitude toward . political trends in this area.
Dictatorial regimes are fonnidable r·o adblocks to progress in Latin America.
This consideration should have determined the U. S. attitude toward them.
Fallacies of U. S. Policy: The weaknesses of U.S. policy in Latin America
stem from lack of clarity about its ultimate objectives. Indeed, its policy seems
to be directed by oonsiderations which fail to inspire confidence in its sincerity
~such as global strategy in cold war, promotion of export goods and capital,
and the sympathy of the United States Government for certain slogans and
disapproval of others.
Global Strategy: Whether or not the philosophy of mutual secuvity which
epitomizes Qur global strategy is sound in Europe and Asia, it is a
matter of record that it does not apply to Latin America. The evidence is
provided by the actual share of Latin America in total U. S. outlays under
the various mutual security programs (in millions o.{ dollars) :
Appropriations lor Mutual Security, 1957
Latin America
Worlel
The whole program .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. .
Military assistance and defense support .. .
Development assistance .... .. ........ . .. .
Technical assistance ... ... .. . ... . . ..... .

~861
~131

572
158

96
35
27
34

Latin America's share is approximately 5 per cent of the develQpment
assistance program, about 22 per cent of the technical assistance and less than
1 per cent of military assistance and defense support. Its share in all forms
of foreign aid is just 2 per cent, and this is a source of resentment in Latin
that this area is no part in global strategy of the United States and c"onseAmerica: The United States spends billions of dollars on foreign aid but only
2 per cent of these funds go to Latin America. The plain truth, however, is
that this ,a rea plays no part in U. S. global strategy and consequently has little importance in its military program. Latin America's share
in total foreign aid appropria~ions seems humiliatingly 10'W because of
the misleading classification of these appropriations.
The Senate Committee on FQreign Relations, in -its Final Report on Technical Assistance, 1957, suggested a threefold classification of related programs:
"1. Military assistance'--anything from jet planes to shoe laces delivered
directly to military forces.

"2. Economic assistance-anything in the f.onn of capital equipment or
investments.
"3. Technical assistance---anything in the form of knowledge, technique or
know-how."
It can -b e argued, however, that the difference in the purpose of appropriations is more significant than materi-al supplied. Military aid, ~or example,
may include military training of the natives-a transfer of technical knowhow. Similarly, when the United States offers to assist an allied government
in strengthening the bridges on certain strategic routes., in OIrder to make
them passable fOir heavy tanks and artillery, this is a clear case of military
aid in the guise of economic assistance.
The Final Report of the Com1mittee points out · that a reason for the distinction between economic aid ' and defense support may well be the feeling
. on the part of the Administration that something smacking of military aid
is easier to sell to the Congress, and the feeling on the part of Congress that
military aid is more easily sold to the public. The Report expresses the conviction that "both Congress and· the public are wiser and more mature than
this sort of semantics implies.. If the eco,n omic development of country X
is in the national interest of the United States, the,n economic assistance can
be justified on these grounds, without straining the case to east it into"a military mold."
_-:
This observation is correct hut does not go far enough. It may leave the
impression that each policy.-decision in -the field of foreign aid and even each
single project must be approached-.from the angle ()f the national interest of
the United States. As long as such an interpre~ation is possible, foreign economic aid remains subordinated to the global strategy o.f this oountry, and
its policy in Latin America is left with()ut guidance. There must be no "ifs"
in decisions on foreign aid. The United States interest in roonomic and social
progress in a region must be firmly established in advance. It may be more
immediate in one region than in others, and this difference must be taken
into account in the geographical distribution of funds. But implementation
and administration must be determined by the needs and interests of receiving
oountri.es, without any reference to special interests of the United States.
Promotion of Exports: Economic aid and technical assistance are often j ustified as a means for opening new outlets abroad for U.S. products and capital.
The Final Report of _the Senate Committee dramatizes this argument by a
chart which argues: "The More Developed the Country ... The Better Customer It Is." Latin America is conspicuous by its absence froOm this chart.
Were it .included, it would have occupied a place above the United Kingdom
and Germany, which proves clearly enough- the fallacy of the export argument. Indeed, the per capita export from the United States to different countries depends on many factors: the structure of their ooonomies, their need
for articles exported by the United States. competitive position of these articles
on the world market 'a nd so forth. The "and so forth" includes, among otiher
things, the level of economic development of the respective country: Other
conditions being equal, the demand of a country for U. S. products is
likely to increase with the growth of its national income. This general tendency
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is illustrated by the following comparison of the value of our exports to Latin
America and Canad a in 1957'
Population (in million) .... .... . .. . ...... .
Exports from the United States
Total {millions of dollars} .. . .. .... . .. . .
Per inhabitant (dollars) ....... . ..... . .

Canada

Latin America

16.6

193.7

3,879
234

4,487
23

In this general form , the argument shows only thal the United States need
n Dt fear that economic development and indusrialization of Latin America
will reduce its market abroad. Nevertheless, although rising prosperity ~ and
industrializ'a tion in a country may inere~~ U.S. exports, this is not an
immediate, automatic reactiDn. The United States cannDt expect that 'each
million dollars it invests in economic aid in a country will. increase its future
exports to that country by $100,000 or even hy ten cents a year. Perhaps the
country receiving our aid will substitute domestic products for those currently imported from the United States, Dr make purchases in West Gennariy
or haly. To invest public funds in railroads, highways, agriculture or health
in a country in the hope that this operation will bring returns iIi the fDrm: Df
increased future exports is a very duhious speculatiOn.
.
Furthennore, if there were a strong correlation between U.S. eConomic
aid in Latin America and the volume of U.S. exports to that region in the
more or less remote future, there would rem'a in the crucial question of whether
we need to take special measures for increasing our exports. U.S. "e xports of
merchandise currently run far a.bove our imports, as the following figures
show:
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
f955
1956
1957

........... . ................
. ....... . .....................
... . ................... ... . . ...
........ . . . .......... . ......
... . ... . . .. ... ... .... .. ...

.... ...... . ...... . ......
. .. ..... .......... . . . . . ........ . .
Total, 1951-1957 ... . ............

Export

Import

14.9
15.1
15.7
15.0
15.4
18.9
20.6
115.6

10.9
10.8
10.9
10.3
11.4
12.6
13.0
80.1

Surplus 01 e~pofts

..

I

4.0
4.2
4.8
4.7
4.0
6.3
-, ·7:6
35.5

...

!
_,

I

I

The cumulative value of U.S. exports has exceeded that of imports. I;.y $35..5
billion in the past seven years. What advantage has this impressive' trade
bal~nce brought to the nation? Actually, the United States h~s ,giv:en ';a w'a y
domestic products worth $115.6 billion for foreign products .worth , $&0.1
billion. * But, apart from .other items in the balance of payments" a su:ip~s of
e)(port~ oyer imports results . in the accumulation of holdings 'abroad, :_ whi~h
is , f~vorahle 9nly fqr a nation that plans-at some later 't ime-to .t~e 'th~
profits from its ,foreign investments in the ~onn of hnPo~' In oth~r words,
*The lIurplu8 in export of merchandise and invisible export (transportation cod, profits from . foreign in·
vestment and so on) wall partly balan.eed by foreign aid, special conditions in export of agricult~ral Burplus
commodities, and accumulation ~f holdings of U .~. corporations abroad. 'Thi~ does not hrvali~at;e the' a.rgument
that outlets for U.S. merchandise ahtoad exceed by far the ability or willingnell of tb.e~ni,t~~ , Stat!!s to im.
port.
' ,
I
' \
,.

the only economic justificatio.n ' of a temporary surpluS of eXPo.rt is that it
will permit the country to. impo.rt more in the future than it eXPo.rts. Since
there is no. indicatio.n that the United States will reverse its balance o.f trade in
the dooades to. co.me, its chance to. reco.ver the current surplus of eXPo.rts
o.ver imports is very doubtful.
In general, the weak Po.int o.f U.S. foreign trade is no.t the lack of outlets
abro.ad hut the 0ontinuo.us excess of eXPo.rts o.ver hnpo.rts. The sensible go.al
of our fo.reign trade Po.licy therefore is to narrow o.r clo.se this gap by increasing nnpo.rts, reducing eXPo.rts o.r bo.th. Subo.rdinatio.n 'Of o.ur fo.reign aid
policy to. the search o.f new o.utlets is contrary to this goal.
Thus, the defense of foreign aid as a means ,fo.r increasing eXPo.rts gets a
strange twist: The United States is invited to spend public money in o.rder
to. expo.rt more and mo.re, although each inorement in export represents an
additional lo.ss. Of co.urse, the United States must export, in order to. co.ver
the imports of currently needed raw materials and tro.pical pro.ducts. But the
admonitio.n to. help o.ther co.untries in order to. ~ncrease our exports is inco.ngruous.
Promotion of U. S. Investments:
Pr~sident Ejsenh~wer's ~~ssage o.n ~e
mutual security program urged: "We must co.ntinue to. s~imulaie expansion
of trade and investment in the free world. We must continue helpin'g ~o build
the pro.ductive capacities o.f free natio.ns thro.ugh public ~oans and guarantees
of private investment." In plain words, this meant that the Go.vern,m ent would
SUPPo.rt the ' eXPo.rt o.f go.o.ds and capital thro.ugh pl:lbl,ic lo.an~ ~d ' ~aran~~s.
Stimulation of the eXPo.rt of go.ods thro.ugh public loans is, Hl~eed, ,t he objective of the EXPo.rt-Impo.rt Bank, and there Wo.uld be no. ,o.,bjectio.n t<;> Co.l?tinuati'on o.f its operatio.ns. Public guaran'tees o.f private investments abroad
is ano.ther matter. If the Government ~'an' give such guarant~s to a co.ncern
building a facto.ry abroad, why sh~uld , it not gu~rantee the , pro.fif~-: of,
private concerns within the United States? And, generally, ~hy ' and to.: w.ha~
extent is the United States interested in pro.mo.ting the o.utflo.W of ~apita~~
and occasio.nally the flight of capital-from this country to. the happy 'lands
where there is no. profits tax and payment of o.ther taxes i's ieft' t~~ the 'discretio.n o.f capitalists? What do the people o.f the United States ge~, ultimately,
fro.m investment o.f natio.nal capitai abro.ad? Would ' it not be preferable t~
let this capit'al work in do.me~tic indu~tri~ where it Wo.uld s_trengthe~ 'Co.inpetition amo.ng private co.ncerns, co.ntribute to. the r'ise of pro.du_cti~tyl ;alrid
counteract inflatio.nary pressures which ' cause a co.ntinuous rise of .prid6s?
With all these co.nsideratio.ns in mind, it is difficult to. understand why 'the
pro.mo.tio.n o.f private investment abro.adappears o.~ the' "must" list hf- ou~
mutual security program.
'
. "
In a perio.d o.f acute deflation, the o.utflow o.f ' capital 'as wei! ,as an eXPo.rt
halance are beneficial fo.r a co.untry; when inflatio.nary pressure prevails~
they' are undesirable. Simila.rIy, inflo.w ' of investment to. a 'certain indu~ry
may be welcome to a receiving country, while inflow to. other econoffiic fields
may be harmful. So.me foreign investments are gratifyIng; o.thers are bound
to. pro.voke resentment in the receiving country. Under certain 'c onditions,
large-scale investment of U.S. capital may strengfuen o.ur ties with friendly

an

49

countries, while under other conditions it is more l~kely to cause friotion.
During our stay in Buenos Aires, I had oocasion to read a 120-page concession contract awarded by the Peron Government to a U.S. oil corporation.
I was told that Peron intended to use this contract to pave the way for another,
muoh higger concession, which he would have given later to an Argentine
concern controlled hy himself and his family. The contract with the U.S.
corporation gave full protection to the concessionaire while providing practically none for Argentina and-according to this story-was designed to
provoke criticism within the country and to permit Peron's group to appear
on the scene with an offer to exploit the oHfields on more favorable conditions for the nation than those asked by the Yankees. If this story is true,
Peron's stooges overplayed their hand; the concession produced such an
outburst of protest that it could not be ratified. Indeed, it accelerated the
downfall of the dictator.
One can imagine what the impact of this concession on public O'pinion
in Argentina and other Latin American countries would have been if it had
been ratified. Would it not have confirmed the Communist charges of the
arrogance of Yankee imperialists?
To sum up, investment O'f U.S. capital in foreign countries is neither hidden
aggression nor a blessing fO'r the receiving nations. It has nO'thing in common with the U.S. mutual security program. Neither encouragement nor
discouragement O'f the O'utflow of U. S. capital -shO'uld :be an objective of our
foreign policy in any 'p art of the world-least O'f all in Latin America.
Promotion of Economic Slogans: M,a ny U.S. representatives in Latin America believe that a country's pro-United States attitude must be expressed by
the abstentiO'n O'f its gO'vernment from intervention in econO'mic affairs, its
reliance on private initiative, and its hospitality toward foreign investments.
If, on the other hand, a government decides to reserve exploration of oilfields
to itself or relies on public regiO'nal development programs, these are manifestatiO'ns of its anti-American tendencies, perhaps of pro-Communist
orientation.
It is difficult to understand this reasO'ning. This country is nO't properly
concerned with public or priv:ate O'wnership of industries in Great Britain,
Germany, France and Japan and is nO't in the least inJterested in the ways in
which Brazil, Mexico or Chile sO'lve this problem. As far as the exploitation
of O'ilfields and mines is concerned, the U.S. Government may feel its obligatiO'n to' defend the interests O'f its citizens if they are subjected to discriminatory treatment or threatened with arbitrary expropriation of their property.
Except fO'r such a situation, it has no reason to prefer any particular form of
enterprises in respective ecO'nomic sootO'rs in foreign countries. Certainly,
exploitation O'f Brazilian oil reserves by a Dutch or a British corporation
presents no advant,a ge to the United States over their exploitation by an
autO'nomous public ,agency. The United States cO'uld O'ppose a national
monopoly of O'il exploitation in a fOTeign country ()lilly if it were interested
in the penetration of its private capital into this field. But, from the point of
view of natiO'nal interest, the United St,ates gains nothing either from outflow
of. capital or its investment in·this particular industry.
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The same reasoning should be applied to public projoots of regional
development. Those who dislike expansion of the economic responsibilities
ot the Government in this oountry are inclined to dislike similar projeots
abroad. But this should be a question of personal opinion rather than a matter
of foreign policy.
The attitude of U.S. representatives in Latin America on such problems
as public or private ownership of industrial plants and public or private
exploitation of mineral resources can be described as an attempt to export
to Latin America slogans which have been rej ected by our allies in Europe
and are an apple of discord in U.S. internal politics. Injection of these issues
into our policy in Latin America does not strengthen the prestige of this
country among governments and intellectuals in these nations.
The U. S. Goal: Thus, the goal of the United States in Latin America is
not to extend the cold war, to promote the U. S. exports, to protect and
build up U. S. investments, to befriend and support pro-big-business governments or any particular eCDnomic doctdne. What, then, does Latin America
mean to the United States in the long run?
The two areas cDmplement one another, one being located essentially in
the m.o derate zone while the bulk of the other belongs to the tropical and
subtropical zones. This relationship may becolne irrelevant ~n the remote
future, but it will remain of decisive impDrtance for many deoades to come.
The two areas, together with Canada, form a tightly knit geDgraphic and
economic region. Anglo-Saxon Amerioa relies on Latin Amerioa fDr tropical
produce, and Latin America finds outlets in Anglo-Saxon America for its
fr uits and minerals. Despite the progressive diversificatiDn of production and
trade of Latin American countries, this tie is bound tD become even stronger
as time goes on, with progress in transportation and commu,nioation, and ,i t
will be further streng,t hened by the increasing econDmic cooperatiDn of
Europe and Africa. The trend in the world economy is toward formation Df
two economic blocs, both stretching from pole to pole and fac~ng each other
across the Atlantic. The hard fact of life is that :t he United States -and Latin
Amerioa find themselves in the same living space and must develop their
regional economy within these limits.
The United States is, therefore, vitally interested in economic progress
in Latin America, in the development of its agriculture and mining, cities
and villages, highways and rivers, in political stahility and the standard
of living of its peoples. Likewise, it is interested in maintaining the
economic unity of the Western Hemisphere in view of the tact that U. S.
mineral reSDurces will be partly deplet~d or dose to exhaustiDn in the not
very remote :f uture.
On the other hand, :t he United States cannot ~nd must: not try to mold
the development of Latin American nations in accordance with the interests
and ideas of its businessmen. The pattern of development in that area w.ill
be determined by its peoples, their governments and their intellectuals. Latin
America's historical hackground is different fronl that of the United States
and Canada and will remain different. It will overcome features of its
colonial heritage which have become an obstacle to its economic ·a nd social
51

progress, but will nOit renounce other aspects of its cultura1 tradition. The
close association of the two Americas, so different as they are, will enrich
both of them culturally. Latin America will profit from the North American
genius for organization (superior technology being only one manifestation
of this genius), while the United States will prnfit f.rom the a'ftistic spirit of
its Southern neighbors.
Taking stock of the economic, social and political trends in Latin America,
the United States must realize their significance for its own future and that
of the Hemisphere. Economic progress, industrialization, political stability,
improvement .of the educational system, better health cond.itions, higher
standards of living and-last but not least-adjustment of the people's attitudes, economic praotices ~ politioal institutions to' the requirements of
modem times, are essential nOit .only fOir the wellbeing of Q1ur sister republics
but f.or the sound progress of the whQlle hemisphere, from the Arotic to the
Antarotic and from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
The SUPPO'rt of these trends in Latin American na,tions must be coosidered the goal and guide line of the U,n ited States policy in this area.
Friendship, mutual confidence and affection oannot be bQlught by loans and
gralIlts but will grow Qut Q1f Q1ur understanding, sympathy ·a nd respect fQlr
the 'Other party. These feelings, however, must be expressed in deeds. Once
the United States has recognized its interest in the current evolution Qf Latin
America, it must ·accept certain responsibilities for accelerating 'a nd facilitating this development. This postulate is not limited to foreign economic
aid 'a nd technical assistance, but also includes certain adj ustments in our
foreign trade PO'licy as far as it affects ,t he interests Q1f Latin American nations. The United Stattes cannot be expected to detennine its toode policy
by other cO'nsideraitiO'ns than its own interest, bUJt its interest demands 00,11sideratiOin for the needs of Latin America. In m·a tters affecting U. S. trade
with this ,region, no decision should be taken without proper consultation
with the Latin America governments.
Latin American Requests: It would be unfair to accuse U. S. policy in
Latin America of disreg'a.rding the desires of the local peoples. All economic
aid loans and emergency grants have been accorded in resPQlnse to requests
of the local governments; all technical assistance proj eets have been either
initiated or aotively supported by these governm.ents. And yet, our Latin
American neighbors complain that what the United States does in Latin
America is not always in accord with its most insistent desires and requests.
For example, a local government may be concerned about the projeots A, B
and C, .a ppraising their urgency in It hat order. For some reason the United
States may decline to help the looal government in projects A and B, but
be willing to support project C. Its contribution will be politely accepted
by the government, but may provoke more resentment than gratitude in the
people. The United States should therefore establish machinery which will
permit it to contribute most efficiently to the drive of Latin American
nations toward economic improvement, payi,ng attention not only to their
needs but also to their feelings.
.
What are their needs? What do they expect from the United States?
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The recent Buenos Aires Economic Conference failed to answer these questions. More recently, luscelino Kubitschek, President of Brazil, has assumed the role of spokesman for Latin America in formulating its aspi:r.ations. He offered four points of discussion at a Latin American summit
conference :
1. Intensified investments in backward areas.
2. Doubled technical assistance.
3. Stabilization of pmces for basic Latin American products on the U. S.
market.
4. Liberaliz'a tion of the lending policies of international finance organizations.
Later, he listed seven points for the immediate attention of Washington
and Latin American oountries: Need of private capital in underdeveloped
areas; an increase in public loans, which would presumably include creation
of an Inter-Amerioan Development Bank; strengthening of the internal
economies in Latin American cou,ntries; the effect of Europe's Common
Market on the America'S; creation of an all-American common market;
technical assistance.
The new program differs from the o,r iginal four points by greater precision
and addition of 't he questions of a common market in Europe 'a nd the Western
Hemisphere. Perhaps new points will be added in the cou~se of preparation
of the conference but, from the point of view of the United States, the
problems raised can be conveniently classified under the headings of trade
and aid policy.
Prices and Tariffs: The pr~nciple that the United States is interested in
the economic progress of Latin Amerioa implies that it should give due consideration to the vital interests of its neighbors in the South in fixing duties
and quotas for coffee, sug.a r, tin, copper, lead, zinc and some other articles.
The administration of Reciprocal Trade Agreements rests on the idea of
compromise between the conflicti,ng interests of various U. S. economic
groups and, occasionally, of various geographic regions of the United
States. Now, the voices of Latin American nations should be added to those
to which the Administration is supposed to listen. Invited to defend their
cause at open hearings, the representatives of Latin America,n nations would
have an opportunity to become familiar with the procedures followed by
this country in solving problems of foreign trade and would learn the
reasons which may compel it to make decisions contrary to their desires.
The same principle applies to the problem of stabilizing prices of certain
Latin America.n produots on the U. S. market. The problem can be solved
either by worldwide commodity agreements or by regiGnal-multilateral or
bilateral-agreements. Both possibilities should be explored. Each agreement presents certain advantages to and requires some concessions from
bGth parties. The attitude of the United States Government toward commodity a.greements has been negative, 'aIlld! it can be anticipated that it
will try to limit the SCGpe and duration of suoh arrangements. But ,i t will
make a grave mistake if it does not heed the point of view of Latin
American nations. Its concessions must be based Gn the notion that the
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agreements would cause comparatively small losses .t o the United States
while ·a t the same time protecting the other side .a gainst serious .economic
dislocations.
Common Market: The Americas can hardly do much now about the Common Market in Europe, although Latin America,n nations-especially those
exporting coffee-are seriously concerned about its possible effect on their
exports. They believe that a European Common Market which includes a
large part, or the whole, of Africa, will be practically closed to their coffee.
An AU-American Common Market would at least leave them the American
market.
It is doubtful whether this problem permits a solution wholly agreeable
to ·all parties concerned. It must be kept in mind that Latin America accounts for 25-30 per oent of U. S. foreign trade, while Europe, its overseas
dependencies and members of the British Commonwealth account for 60-65
per cent. This relationship makes it impossible for the United States to
participate in an all-American customs union. More realistic are pending
projects ooncerning a Latin American Common Market, or a Common
Market for Central America. The United States ought to support such
projects, short of direct participation, and try to accommodate Latin
Amerioan ooffee producers by a commodity agreement.
Private Investments: President Kubitschek's program stresses the need for
intensified private investment in "hackward areas." His meaning is not very
clear. Neither Brazil and Mexioo nor Colomhia and Chile consider themselves backward. Other La-tin American nations recognize that their economy
is underdeveloped but would protest against being described as backward.
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However, all Latin Amerioan nations are keenly aware that they have some
backward spots. Does President Kubitschek invite private capital to those
particular areas, or does he mean ,t hat investment is welcome in any economic
sector and any area of Latin America? The vagueness of his proposal may
be intentio:n al: He raises the question without revealing his own attitude
toward it.
The United States Government faces a difficult pro,blem. Since it is expected to protect all U. S. citizens abroad, its embassies must, among other
things, defend the legitimate rights of U. S. businessmen. But they must
make it clear to everybody that they represent not the capital but the people
of the United States. During our trip thvough Latin America we met U. S.
represenJt:atives who were keenly aware of this pIinciple, as well as others
who were concerned primarily with U. S. investment abroad.
The matter of private investment challenges not only the official representatives of the United States in Latin America but also economists who
visit this ·a rea. Too often they overemphasize the role of capital in economic
progress, the relatio;nship between capital input and increment in national
income, the magic power of private enterprise and the like. There may be
some truth in their theories considered against the background of the United
States, but in Latin America they sound like TV commercials and often
provoke irritation and distrust in the listeners.
Foreign Aid: Neither Presi,d ent Kubitschek nor the economic conference
in Buenos Aires asked the United States for grants or a new Marshall Plan
for the Western Hemisphere. Rather, ,t hey asked for repayahle loans and
expressed a strong q.esire to obtain such loans through an inter-American
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financial ~nstitute. In public discussion of these requests, the idea of an
inter-American development bank gained particular attention as the main
issue of the forthcoming summit oonference, and when the U. S. UnderSecretary of State for Economic Affairs annou,nced the willingness of this
country to consider this plan, some Latin American diplomats welcomed this
- lairly weak-promise as realization of an old dream of the sister-republics.
This plan is old indeed, almost 70 years old. It appeared in discussions
during the first International Co,n ference of Amerioan States held in Washington in 1889-90. Subsequent inter-American conferences have returned,
tllme and again, to this idea. No pr.actical steps have been taken in this
direction. After World War II, the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund .a ppeared on the scene. Since Latin American oountries are represented
in ·b oth institutions, their operations in Latin America are somewhat similar
to those which would be carried out by an inter-Amerioan Bank. The Eximbank development loans are of a similar chaflaoter. The attitude of the U. S.
Government has therefore been that there is no need for a special interAmerican development bank. The Latin American nations ,h ave not shared
this attitude, la nd a cleavage in opinions o,n this subject has .a ppeared in all
inter-American conferences since 1950. This has been a very annoying point
of disagreement, since the United States could be portrayed as denying
fi,nancial aid to Latin American countries.
The funds of an inter-American development bank cannot be pflovided by
pooling the financi,al resources of Latin Amerioa-with Br.azil lending money
to Ecuador, Ecuador extending credit to Argent~na ·a nd Argentina financing
development proj eets in Mexico. Substantially, the bulk of funds must come
from the United Staltes. * The question is whether aD/d to what extent the
United States will foot the bill and how the new institution will administer
the funds.
If the U;nited States decides to support economic development in Latin
Amerioa, it wiH have to clarify its attitude ,to two problems: first, the comparative advantages of loans and grants; seoond, the merits and disadvantages
of aid to the host country through bilateral agreements and through a ,special
inter-American .agency.
The distinction between loans 'a nd gra,nts is more important to the receiving than to the giving oountry. A loan which will ,b e repaid by the receiving government in local currency in 40 years must be financed by
the giv,~ng oountry in precisely the same way as a grant. Ultimately, it is
underwritten by the taxpayers, and the latter ·a re entitled to know how
their money is spent and what their country gets for it. More than in any
ther field of public finance, the best policy in this case is that of honesty
and frankpess: The people must know what each appropriation means.
From the purely financial point of view, there is little difference for the
United States between loans and g:r:ants, direct and indirect aid, economic
and toohnical assistance: The people of the United States are asked to give
• The Unit ed States currently contributes 70 per cent of the funds to the technical cooperation program.
of the Organization of American States. Half of the remainder is underwritten by Brazil and Argentina and
the rest is distributed among eighteen member nations .
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up a small fractiDn-perhaps, Dne-tenth Df Dne per cent- Df their income
to suppDrt economic progress, peace ,a nd prosperity in the Western Hemisphere, a part Df which is the United States itself. Training teachers and
building schoDls, agricultural extensiDn services and irrigatiDn projects; instruc~g farmers and supplying them with agricultural implements; develDping health centers and establishing hDspitals; training sanitatiDn employes
and providing cities with pDtable water, are parts .of the same program, although the outlays may be segregated fDr adnnnistrative and budgetary
reasons.
If our analysis Df the present phase Df econDmic develDpment Df Latin
Amerioa is cDrrect, if the peculiarity and greatest weakness of the local
eCDnomy lies in its uneven, lopsided devel.opment, then financial and technical aid are mDst urgently needed in the same economic sectors and the
same areas, and .the success of a proj oot depends on i,ntegratiDn Df all 'aspects
of developmental effDrts. More specificailly, the mDre emphasis is put Dn
regional development, the clDser shDuld be the cDordination hetween financial
and technical assistance. CDordinatiDn is essential not Dnly fDr regional
development prDj ects of the TVA type but alsO' for large-scale resettlement
and rehabilitatiDn plans, and mDst of all fDr broad regiDnal programs such
as thDse vaguely envisaged in Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
In view of the special interest of the United States in Latin America, prO'grams fDr this area must be integrated independently of the glohal U. S.
strategy. A regional center might be established, for example, fDr MexicO',
Central America and the Carib beans; anDther ·fDr Venezuela, CDlombia,
EcuadDr, Peru, BDlivia and Paraguay; ·a third for Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay; and a fourth fDr Brazil. Perhaps the number of regiD,ns should
be increased and individual natiDns grouped in anDther way. The essential
principle is cDDrdination Df all fDrms Df forei:g n aid, Dn a brDader scale than
small independent republics.
Economic Aid: Economic aid in the fDrm Df blank checks to' the governments Df Latin American countries wDuld nDt contribute much to' the
economic develDpment Df the continent and, in the IDng run, may prDve
harmful. ECDnomic planning in this area has not reached the level Dn which
each IDcal gDvernment can ask an inter,natiDnal agency to' underwrite its
develDpmental budget. I.t can request foreign loans Dnly for clearly described
prDjects whioh it cannot carry out with its own financial reSDurces. The
proper fDnn of aid in thi,s situation has been developed hy the W DrId Bll1lk.
The lending agency must carefully appraise each prDject. After an ,agreement with the host government abDut the financing of the project, it wDuld
Dpen credit for defraying a part Df expenses during a year or twO', with the
.understanding that further credit wDuld be accorded if the prDjeot proceeds
in accordance wi,t h the established plan. Thus the lending agency assumes
the right and obligatiDn to' oheck the prDgress of the prog]}am in the same
way as a private bank contrDls the use Df its loans by debtors.
The United States could offer financial aid to' developmental plans of Latin
America in the same way as the WDrId Bank, with twO' mDdifications: First,
it could participate in certain IDng-range prDjeots ,Dn the basis of a clearly
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defined cooperation agreement with the host government; seco,n d, it could
underwrite in adv·ance a fund for installment payments over several years.
The last type of arrangement is most suitable for large-scale regional projects.
While supplementing the operations of the W o:rld Ba,n k and Eximbank,
this form of economic aid would concentrate on proj eots which cannot be
supponted by these ,agencies and are not within the scope of the International
Monetary Fund. The scope of operations of the new development bank
cannot be esti'm ated 'a t ,t he present phase of the discussion. It must be established on the hasis. of careful study of the financial needs and absorptive
capacity of Latin America, taking li nto account the experience of ,t he W orId
Bank ~n this area. It would be pointless to start operations with a fund which
oould .be exhausted ·b y two or three large allocations. Likewise, it would be
harmlul to PUit at the disposal -o f the bank funds which would induce it to .
give loans for economioally unsound or doubtful projects. The l,i mit of its
ope:ratio,ns may be in the -order of magnitude of $250-300 mjllion a year,
which would require a subscribed capital of $1-$1.5 billion.
The essential point is to reconcile the desire of Latin America,n countries
to get assistance through an inter-American lending agency and the lukewarm ·atti.ttide of the United States toward such an agency. The new institution may act ,as an ~ntermediary between Latin American republics an.d the
United States, or another lending government. Essential are the character
and organization of the new inter-American center.
It is obvious ,t hat a new bank which can become a foothall ~n local
politics would bning more harm than good to Latin America. It can achieve
its purpose only if it is absolutely independent and is insulated against
political pressures. Such indepen,dence may be secured by a provision that its
president must be appointed by the W orId Bank and selected ·: hom the r~nks
of experts with international reputations who are not citizens of any American
country.
An arrangement can be worked out under which the United States would
not be directly involved in eaoh loan neg.oti'a tion and yet w-ould get sufficient
moral 'a nd political credit for its participation in the drive of Latin American
countrlies for economic revival. Perhaps the United States would prefer, ~or
psychologioa'l ta nd political reasons, to carry out certain projects on the basis
of direct cooperation with the host nation (as under the Point FOlllr program),
while at the same time supporting the inter-Amerioan agency. The question '
of 't he relationship between the ,two types 0'£ operations is not clear at the.
present phase of the discussion. But this muoh is certain: United States eoonomk aid to Latin America, whether direct or through an inter-American
body, must be oriented toward large-scale proj eets of unquestionable and
lasting v'a lue for the people of the respective oountries and must have no
other purpose.
Technical assistance: The Subcommittee on Technioal Assistance of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has found appropriate words in
stressing the role of teohnical assistance in economic and social progress:
"The determining factor is not economic development itself, but the whole
complex of political and social i,nstitutions in which economic devel-opment
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takes place 'and the social and political changes which .occur as a oonsequence
of economic development.
"Technical assistance is in the natio.nal interest of the United States when
and only when it not only promotes eoonomic development but also. en<cowrages the growth of free institutions within the framework of a free
society.
"Technioal assistance in agriculture may result in sharp inoreases in cropyields, but it will fail of i,ts purpose (indeed, it may be positively harmful)
unless it is accompanied by measures designed to bring about a fair distribution of the increases between landlo.rds and te;nants. In many underdeveloped
countries, this means land reform. Otherwise soci'al stresses within the country
may be inoreased, and Communist pro.paganda may find a greater receptivity
as a result of technical assistance than it did before technical assistance was
undertaken.
"Similarlv, technical assistance in education may result in sharp increases
in literacy, but again it will be less than fully effective if the school system is
not adapted to meeting the country's needs. . . . MoreO'ver, it serves the
national interests of neither the United States nor the recipient oountry to
increase the number 0.£ holders of law and liberal arts degrees in an economy
which may be ,a lready surfeited with frustrated intellectuals and needs
plumbers and mechanics."
The conclusion to be drawn fro.m .these observations should be that technical
assistance must be a part of a broader program of economic aid. It should
be ooordinated with support of developmental projects and fit into the general
plan of cultur'al, social and economic progress in the area.
It should be reoognized that the role of technical assistance in the progress
of a country is not ,s imply the transfer of ,b etter technology. The latter can be
transferred to' backward areas mechanically by building factories, power
stations, railroads and airports or by importing modern machinery, but these
forms of transfer should not be considered technical assistance. The essential
feature of ,t echnical assistance is that it deals with the human factor of
economic progress and strengthens it by improving health conditions and
teaching people to use their hands and brains efficiently for everyday tasks.
In this respect, there is a great simHarity between our Point Four program
and the Community Development movement in India.
.
If our observation is correot that poverty in certain parts of Latin Amerioa
is due primarily to human factors rather than scarcity of natural . reSources
and lack of capital, technical assistance is .the proper 'a nswer to the m'o sf
urgent problems in this 'a rea. Its scope should be extended, and the suggestion
of President Kubitschek that the United States double i,t s appro.priations for '
this form of fo.reign aid in Latin America ,seems rather conservative. As the
preceding chapter has shown, the technical assistance prog,r am has been
highly successful in certain Latin American count,r ies but has no.t been applied
on a large scale in other areas. The next step should be its geographic
extension, especially in the underdeveloped sections of such countries as
Brazil, Mexico, Chile and perhaps Argentina. Certain parts of all these
countries are on about the same level oI education, health, agricultural
59

technique and standard of living as the backward areas in Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru and Bolivia. For purely psychological reasons, however, the governments
of the more progressive nations are reluctant to let U. S. technicians work in
provinces which they themselves have neglected. They accept the U. S. technical assistance fOT developing civil aviation or arranging public services,
but not for establishing elementary schoo'Is and rudimentary sanitation in
remote villages.
This difficulty could be overcome within the framework of regional projects
in which technical assistance and economic aid are integrated in the general
plan. The United States could be called upon to cooperate with the local
government in developing and executing such plans, supplying technicians,
certain materials and equipment, while the local go,v emment would pro·vide
the labor force, the bulk of the technical and supervisory personnel, and
locally available materials, also assuming the responsibility for high-level
control over the whole proj ect. A;r rangements of this type may be particularly
effective in the development of large river basins, iso.lated rural areas and
continental transportation systems. There is no point, however, in using this
metho.d for proj ects which can be handled by lo.cal organizations with limited
economic aid from the United States or the World Bank, such as the Cauca
Valley development project or expansion of the nationalized petroleum
industry in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
Expansion of technical assistance activities along these lines would, of
course, require additional 'a ppro.priations-perhaps more tJhah the suggested
doubling of expenditures under present program. The controlling factor will
be the difficulty in recruiting the necessary persoll1nel. As we have mentioned,
the Point Four administration has been successful in selecting i,t s personnel
for work in foreign oountries, with foreign people, under strange and often
difficult conditions. But Tecruiting such workers and replacing them has become ' increasingly difficult. To expand the program, the work of Point Four
personnel must be made more attractive for those who fit exacting requirements. One of the most discussed s()llutions of the problem is to give it a
permanent status similar to that in the Foreign Service, with the same chances
of promotion and the same security. *
Economics and Politics: Economics in Latin America are permeated with
politics. Many people there consider politics as the most profitable business,
an·d wealth as the title to political power. These notions, brought to Latin
America by its former coloni'al masters, proved stronger than the armies
routed by Bolivar and San Martin. The central issue in the contest between
the democratic and dictatori,a l forms of government is the liberation of the
continent from these ideas. Democratic governments may be strong or weak,
oompetent or ignorant, honest or venal; dictators may be benevolent rulers
or .tyrants; but economic and social progress in this part of the wo.rJd depends
on elimination of dictatorial regimes and their replacement by democratically
elected responsible gover~ments.

*

The National Planning Association has made a number of constructive recommendations (or development
of technical cooperation in Latin America. The author is in agreement with most of its suggestions but would
supplement them in three directions: integration of technical asaistance and economic aid; emphasis on large .
• eale projecb and regional planniDg; .ub.tantia! expansion or the program.
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United States eco,nomic policy in Latin America must take the political
climate in that 'a rea into account. Should it support local dictators in recompense for their finn stand against Communism and their benevolence toward
big business? Should it launch a crusade fOor democracy? Or should it observe
trict neutrality between the clashing forces?
The first two lines of policy must be rejected because they would imply
active intereference of the United States in the internal affairs O'f Latin American countries. On the other hand, the United States canlIlot be completely
neutral concerning an issue which directly affects the vital interests of the
whole Western Hemisphere. There must be no ambiguity in the ideological
attitude of the United States on the issue of democracy vs. dictato:r.ship. Its
solidarity with the forces of democracy and prQgress in Latin America must
be clearly expressed, and nQt .only in wO'rds but in deeds and, first O'f all, in the
orientation of its economic PQlicy.
The United States oan neither exclude Latin American countries with
diotatorial governments frQm commodity agreements nor award preferential
tariffs to cQuntries with democratic regimes. It should nQt Wlithdraw its technical assist'ance frQm a country because of the change in its political regime,
but it can give more generous economic aid to democratic oountries as a
means of strengthening them not only economioally but alsO' politically. It can
put particular emphasis 0n projects which strengthen inter-American ties,
and oontribute to the triumph of progressive, dynamic forces over those of
reaction and st'a gnation. It must not use economic 'a id for molding the
economy of Qther countries according to its own interests but it can use it
as 'a means for helping the democratic nations 9f Latin Americ,a on the road
to freedom and independence they have chosen for themselves.
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APPENDIX

Basic facts About Latin American· Countries
The following facts have been gathered by the staff of THE NEW
to supplement the stati -tics accompanying Dr. Woytinsky's
text. For country-by-country figures on per capita and total national
income, see page 7; distribution of the labor force, page 9; illiteracy,
page 22; foreign trade, page 26; United States share in trade, page 29;
U. S. investments, page 32; U. S. technical assistance and ecol1omic
aid, by country and activity, pages 37 and 38.

LEADER

Argentina: Area: 1.1 million sq. mi. Population: 19.8 million. Principal
cities: Buenos Aires (capital, 3.5 million), Rpsario (467,000), Cordoba
(450,000). Money: peso, U. S. 5.5c. Chief crops: Wheat; corn, barley,
rye, ~inseed, oats, sugar, wine, cotton, animal products. Chief industries:
meaf-pac~~g,. flour. milling, shipping. ', Mineral res9urces.: petr,oleum, silver;'
copper, gold. President: ' Arturo Frondizi, Intransigent Radical, elected
1958. Recent History: Dictatorship under Juan Peron, established 1?43,
was overthrown in 1955. Provisional Government under General Pedro
Aramburu, after arranging freely-elected Constituent, Assembly to revise
Constitution, withdrew in favor of elected President and Congress.
Bolivia: Area: 419,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.2 million. Principal cities:
La Paz (capital, 321,000), Cochabamba (80,000). Money: boliviano.
Chief crops: potatoes, cacao, coffey, barley, highland rice, rubber ' and
chinchona bark. Chief industry: mining. Mineral resources: tin (15%
of world output), silver, copper, lead, zinc, antinomy, wolfram, gold, petroleum. President: Hernan Siles Zuazo, Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
(MNR), elected 1956. Recent history: Mass revolution in 1952 overthrew
military junta and established MNR government under Victor Paz Estenssoro, which nationalized mines and promoted agrarian reform, economic
evdirsification, welfare of rural Indians.
Brazil: Area: 3.2 million sq. mi. Population: 61 million. Principal cities:
Sao Paulo (3.1 million), Rio de Janeiro (capital, 2.9 million), Salvador
(523,000), Porto Alegre (504,000). Money: cruzeiro, u.S. 5.4c. Chief
crops: coffee (supplies 60% of U.S. consumpiton), sugar (world's second
leading producer), hogs (second leading), cattle, cotton, rice, cocoa, fruit.
Chief industries: steel, aluminum, cement, manufacturing, aviation. Mineral
resources: manganese, oil, monazite, gold, mica, oil. President: Juscelino
Kubitschek, Social Democrat (conservative), elected 1955. Recent history:
A succession crisis followed the suicide of Getulio Vargas (dictator, 193045 and 1951-54), in which there were three Acting Presidents in 14 months.
Since the election of Kubitschek, normal democratic processes have been
restored. Portuguese-speaking.
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Chile: Area: 286,000 sq. mi. Population: 7 million. Principal cities: ,San"
tiago (capital, 1.5 million), Valparaiso (222,000). Money: peso, U.S .
. O·. lc. Chief crops: dairy, wheat, rice, barley, oats, fruits, wine. Chtef industries: .rpining, steel. Mineral resources: nitrates, copper, iron, cqal, gold,
silver, .cobalt; zinc, manganese. President: Jorge Alessandri, Liberal-Con ·
s.ervative, elected 1958. R~cent.. h.istpry: . Six-y~ar :pr~~.igency of Gen~ral
. Carlos 'Ibanez saw efforts to curb rampant inflation. In 1958 Presidential
. election, .Popular Fr<>nt candic;late placed 'strong second .
. Colombia Area: 440,000 sq. mi. Population: 13 million. Principal cities:
Bogota (capital, 1.1 million), Medellin (545,000). Money: peso, U.S. 40c.
Chief crops: coffee (second largest exporter), rice, tobacco, cotton, cocoa,
sugar, lumber, rubber. Chief industry: mining. Mineral resources: emeralds,
gold, silver, copper, lead, petroleum. President: Alberto Lleras Camargo,
Liberal, elected 1958. Recent history: Conservative-Liberal civil strife
(1948-53) led to dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla, overthrown in
1957. Conserva~ives and Liberals have agreed to 12-year joint admini . .
stration.
Costa Rica: Area: 23,000 sq. mi. Population: 1 million. Principal city:
San Jose (capital, 123,000). Money: colon,. U.S. 15c. Chief crops: coffee,
bananas, cocoa, abaca, corn, sugar. Chief industries: lumber, mining. M!neral resource$: gold, silver, quartz. President: Dr. Mario Echandi, conser. .
vative, elected 1958. Recent history: After overthrow of corrupt dic ...
tatorship in 1948, moderate socialist governments under Otilio Ulate and
Jose Figueres promoted education, housing, health.
Cuba: Area: . 44,000 sq. mi . . Population: . 6 million. principal cities:
Havana (capital, 1.2 million), Holguin (227,000). Mqney: peso, U.S. $1.
Chief · crops: sugar cane . (world's leading producer), tobacco, molasses,
coffee,. pineapples, bananas, woods. Chief industries: cigar manufacturing,
t~xtiles. Mineral resources: iron, copper, manganese, nickel. Dictator:
Fulgencio Batista, seized power 1952. Recent history: Rebel .movement
under .Fidel Castro active in eastern part of island since· 1956 .
. '- Domin'iean Republic: Area: 19,000 sq. mi. Population: 2.6 million. Principal city: Ciudad Trujillo (capital, 250,000-called Santo Domingo
'1496-1936) .. Money: peso, U.S:, $1.. Chief crops: sugar, cacao, mola~ses,
coffee, rice, com, tobacco. Chief industries: rum, alcohol, chocolate. M /neral resources: silver, platinum, copper, iron, salt, petroleum. Dictator:
Rafael L. Trujillo. Recent history: Trujillo, personally and through relatives,
has ruled since 1930 with the aid of considerable terror against opponents
at home and abroad .
. Ecuador: Area: 116,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.7 million. Principal cities:
Guayaquil (350,000), Quito (capital, 250,000). Money: sucre, U.S. 6.6c .
.Chief crops: Rice, bananas, cocoa,. balsa wood, cereals, potatoes, fruits,
co~~. C~ief .i~dustries: cement, edible oils, textiles, h~ts, sugar, che~cal
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products. Mineral resources: silver, petroleum, copper, iron, lead. President:
Camilio Ponce Enriquez, Conservative, elected 1956. Recent history:
First Conservative administration in 60 years, narrowly elected in fourcornered race, has improved highways, railroads, industry with U.S. aid.
EI Salvador: Area: 8,000 sq. mi. Population: 2.2 million. Principal cities:
San Salvador (capital, 194,000), Santa Ana (110,000). Money: colon,
U .S. 40c. Chief crops: coffee, henequen, sugar, cotton, balsam. Mineral
resources: gold, silver. President: Lt. Col. Jose Maria Lemus, elected
unopposed 1956. Recent history: After three democratic postwar years,
military junta took over in 1948, has dominated ever since.
Guatemala: Area: 42,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.4 million. Principal
cities: Guatemala City (capital, 294,000), Quezaltenango (27,000).
Money: quetzal, U.S. $1. Chief crops: Coffee, bananas, sugar, rice, cotton,
chicle. Mineral resources: silver, gold, copper, iron, lead, zinc. President:
General Manuel Ydigoras, elected 1958. Recent history: Democratic
revolution led by Juan Jose Arevalo in 1944 came under pro-Communist
influence under his successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. He was deposed
by a coup with U.S. Embassy encouragement under Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who ruled from 1944 until his assassination in 1957. After
a fraudulent election in 1957 resulted in street demonstrations, new elections saw conservative Y digoras, with leftist backing, defeat Government
candidate.
Haiti: Area: 10,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.3 million. Principal cities:
Port au Prince (capital, 195,000), Aux Cayes (195,000). Money: gourde,
U.S. 20c. Chief crops: coffee, sisal, cotton, sugar, bananas, cocoa, tobacco,
Mineral resources: copper, gold, silver, iron. President: Dr. Fran~ois
Duvalier, elected 1957. Recent history: Overthrow of corrupt strong-man
Paul Magloire in 1956 led to long bloody interregnum from which Duvalier,
with Army support, finally emerged triumphant and repressed his main
foes. French-speaking.
Honduras: Area: 43,000 sq. mi. Population: 1.7 million. Principal cities:
Tegucigalpa (capital, 100,000). Money: lempira, U.S. 50c. Chief crops:
bananas, coconuts, hardwoods, coffee, tobacco. Mineral resources: gold,
silver, copper, lead, zinc. President: Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, Liberal,
elected 1957. Recent history: Julio Lozano Diaz ruled without Parliament
from 1954 to 1956, when he was overthrown by military junta, which
summoned new Constituent Assembly in 1957.
Mexico: Area: 760,000 sq. mi. Population: 31 million. Principal 'cities:
Mexico City (capital, 3.8 million), Guadalajara (380,000), Monterrey
(340,000). Money: peso, U.S. 8c. Chief crops: coffee, sisal (half the
world's supply), com, rice, sugar, wheat, tobacco, cotton, animal products.
Chief industries: iron and steel, textiles, flour, beverages, soap, cigarettes
and cigars, paper and rubber products, handicrafts. Mineral resources:
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silver (31 % of world production), petroleum, gold, copper, lead, · zinc,
graphite, molybdenum. President: Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Party of Revolutionary Institutions, elected 1958. Recent history: Since the social revolution of 1910-17, democracy has operated within the governing party, which
has elected one-term, six-year Presidents in orderly succession and has
made steady progress in modernizing the economy. The PRI left wing is
led by former President Lazaro Cardenas, who nationalized oilwells in
1937; the right wing by former President Miguel Aleman (1946-52) .
Nicaragua: Area: 57,000 sq. mi. Population: 1.2 million. Principal
cities: ~1anagua (capital, 141,941). Money: cordoba, U.S. 7c. Chief crops:
bananas, coffee, sugar cane, cotton, fruit, animal products. Mineral resources: gold, lumber. Dictator: Luis Somoza, since assas:: ination of his
father, dictator Anastasio Somoza, in 1956. Recent history: Better relations
with neighboring countries and somewhat more civil freedom under son
than father.
Panama: Area: 28,000 sq. mi. Population: 947,000. Principal cities:
Panama City (capital, 127,000), Colon (52,000). Money: balboa, U.S.
$1. Chief crops: mahogany, bananas, coffee, rice, pineapples, sugar. Chief
industry: shipping (fourth in world). President: Ernesto de la Guardia Jr.,
elected 1956. Recent history: Split in ruling party, 1957.
Paraguay: Area: 157,000 sq. mi. Population: 1.6 million. Principal
cities: Asuncion (capital, 210,000), Encarnacion (33,000). Money:
guarani, U.S. 0.8c. Chief crops: corn, mandioca, cotton, beans, peanuts,
tobacco, fruits, livestock. Mineral resources: timber, iron, manganese, copper. Dictator: General Alfredo Stroessner, since 1954. Recent history:
A five-month civil war in 1947 led to the rule of the Colorados, supported
by Argentina's Peron. Coups within the ruling party in 1948, 1949 and
1954.
Peru: Area: 514,000 sq. mi. Population: 9.7 million. Principal cities:
Lima (capital, 1 million), Arequipa (120,000). Money: sol, U.S. 5.3c.
Chief crops: cotton, sugar, wheat, corn, rice, animal products. Mineral
resources: vanadium, copper, petroleum. President: Dr. Manuel Prado,
elected 1956. Recent history: Civil strife between APRA (People's party,
led by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, with influence in other countries)
and conservatives led to authoritarian rule after the war. But General
Manuel A. Odria, strong man 1948-56, yielded to free election which
chose conservative Prado, whose first act was to legalize APRA and restore freedom.
Uruguay: Area: 72,000 sq. mi. Population: 2.6 million. Principal cities:
Montevideo (capital, 900,000). Money: peso, U.S. 25c. Chief crops: meat,
wool, hides, corn, wheat, fruits, rice, tobacco. Chief industries: meatpacking, textile, wine-making. President: Council system on Swiss model
since 1951. Recent history: Under the postwar leadership of Luis Battle
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Berres of the liberal Colorado party, Uruguay has continued to set the pace
as the most stable and socially-advanced democracy of the Hemisphere.
Venezuela: Area: 352,150 sq. mi. Population: 6 .million. Principal cities:
Caracas (capital, 1.1 million), Maracaibo (390,000). Money: bolivar,
u.s. 29.9c. Chief crops: coffee, sugar, cacao, livestock. Chief Industries:
mining. Mineral resources: petroleum, iron, gold, copper, coal, salt, tin,
manganese. President (provisional): Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, led
junta formed in 1958. Recent history: Military coup in 1948 ousted Democratic Action administration under Romulo Gallegos, established dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez, which worked closely with foreign
petroleum interests. Popular revolution in 1958 established provisional
junta, restored civil liberties. Presidential election scheduled for December
7, 1958.

66

THIS TAMIMENT INSTITUTE PUBLIC
SERVICE PAMPHLET was originally published
in THE NEW LEADER. Copies may be obtained by
writing to the Institute at 7 East 15th Street,
New York 3, N. Y. The rates are as follows:
Single copy ... . ... . . . ..... . .. 25 cents
100 cop~s ... . . . . . . ........... . . $20
. .. $175
1,000 copies ... . . . ... . . . .
The purpose of the Tamiment Institute is to foster the cultivation of the arts and sciences and to
contribute to an understanding of the nation's social, political and economic problems.

TAMIMENT INSTITUTE
PUBLIC SERVICE PAMPHLETS
DE,M OCRACY AND DESEGR'E GATION
by Sidney Hook
1 copy ........ 15c; 100 copies ..... $12.50

u.s.

HOUSING: A NEW PROGRAM
by Charles Abrams

1 copy ' ....... 15c; 100 copies ........ $1 0

THE CR'I SIS IN U.S. DEFENSE
by Klaus Knorr
1 copy ........ 20c; 100 copies ........ $15

LET A HUNDRED FLOWERS BLOOM
by Mao Tse-tung
(notes and introduction by G. F. HudsonJ

1 copy ........ 20c; 100 copies ........ $15

CONSERVING OUR GREAT OUTDOORS
by Richard Neuberger
free on request; htclude 4c postage

The Tamiment Institute and Library
7 East 15 Street, New York 3. N.Y.
ALgonquin 5-6250
The Tamiment Institute is a cultural, educational, social-welfare project
of the People's Educational Camp Society, Inc., which operates
Tamiment, a summer resort in the Poconos of Pennsylvania.

